

BREAKING AWAY FROM THE BEAR

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FOREWORD

In just half a decade, Central Asia has gone from being a backwater known only to selected scholars to one of the most closely watched spots on the globe. In the words of *The Economist*, “Barely six years after emerging from the rubble of the Soviet Union . . . attracted by substantial proven reserves . . . and by the promise of fabulous wealth from the oil and gas fields that have yet to be explored fully, the world’s oil bosses are falling over themselves to secure a piece of the Caspian action.”¹

Central Asia is a region of potential wealth; it is a region of potential turmoil. It is characterized by multi-ethnic societies—the product of centuries of transmigration and political exile, separated by boundaries drawn by central authorities in part to “divide and conquer” the indigenous population and turn them on one another (rather than Moscow). Central Asia is the last remnant of the Soviet model: paper constitutions that promise much but assure little, line and block charts for administrative procedure that mask rule by an oligarchy of the few supporting the one man in charge; and “multiple militaries,” with several agencies possessing armed forces, each with its own mission, its own military, and its own agenda.

Lieutenant Colonel Dianne L. Smith examines the development of post-Soviet Central Asian armed forces, Central Asian efforts to guarantee their national security, and the implications for the United States of this struggle. She cautions that the United States use its influence and its military-to-military contact programs judiciously. This is a region of great instability, with massive infusions of energy wealth just beyond the horizon. If these states can create viable methods to ensure domestic and regional security, this wealth may produce prosperity and secure well-being for their citizens. If these states fail to create institutions to preserve their national sovereignty, the new century could presage long, lingering chaos and waste on a grand scale. One need only look south to Afghanistan for such a model.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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SUMMARY

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states preferred to ensure their security through the unified command of the Commonwealth of Independent States and collective security. But, the decision of Ukraine, and then Russia, to create independent republican forces compelled the Central Asian states to create their own armed forces. Depending on their relative success at developing viable military forces, each state has compensated with other tools of national power. Budgetary considerations and assessment of real-world threats have compelled each state to make hard decisions concerning relative investment in conventional armed forces, security forces, or border guards. To avoid further dependence upon Moscow, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have attempted joint security ventures. Tajikistan remains dependent upon Russian troops and Central Asian peacekeeping forces. Turkmenistan hopes that a policy of nonalignment and neutrality (albeit with active support from Russia) will prove successful. Although they are willing to let Russia assert some authority within Central Asia, each seeks alternative sources for security.

The United States supports the development of Central Asian armed forces to ensure that collective security is just that—collective. Indeed, America has a strong interest in ensuring that Central Asian militaries develop to relative sufficiency so that they are players in the game and not just tools of Moscow.

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Shymkent, Kazakstan, Sept. 15—Paratroops from the United States joined soldiers from five other nations today in a scenic display of long-range airborne deployment skills, in an exercise meant to shore up the independence of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. . . . Marine Gen. Jack Sheehan, commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the first of 540 paratroops to jump from the C-17 cargo planes, pronounced the initial phase of the exercise a success and said it proves “there is no nation on the face of the earth we cannot get to.”

The Washington Post,
September 15, 1997²

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade a significant body of literature has redefined “security.”³ With the end of the Cold War, many scholars criticized the traditional, narrow definition of security and focused on issues other than military affairs, such as population growth, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, crime, drugs, and migration. Nevertheless, the focal point of a nation’s security remains its ability to field a military force capable of defending its territorial integrity, safeguarding its national interests, protecting the lives and property of its citizens, and preserving its sovereignty as an independent state.

Since independence, the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have created armed forces with varying capability to perform these missions. Each has compensated for its military’s weakness with alternative tools of national power and collective security programs. The United States has begun programs in each Central Asian state to assist in the development of these forces. Washington supports this process to ensure that collective security is just that—collective—and that the Central Asian

states are true players in the game and not tools of other regional powers. The ability (or inability) of each new republic to provide credible military force will have long-reaching consequences for the Central Asian states, their neighbors, and the United States.

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The Central Asian republics were an accident of history. In order for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to break up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), their three leaders had to avow the legitimacy of each of the 15 republics making up that union to declare its sovereignty and assert its independence. Independence, however, met with mixed reactions. The Baltic States embraced independence. The Central Asian States broke out into a cold sweat at the thought. Their leaders recognized that central among the many challenges facing them was that of providing for national security and pushed for inclusion within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Several options for providing security in Central Asia existed: collective security, reliance on domestic national armed forces, reliance on a patron (either regional or extra-regional), international guarantee of neutrality, or regional cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

The first, most obvious solution was to create a collective security arrangement within the CIS, which had replaced the USSR. This they did. Yet, 8 years later, as that forum meets, analysts contend “the choice is stark: Should its members paper over its evident collapse or try to start over from scratch?”⁴ Why has this organization failed to provide security for its members?

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

In December 1991, the CIS was created⁵ and the Joint Commonwealth High Command replaced its Soviet High Command predecessor. The republics had one-by-one

declared independence, but they still did not think of themselves as entities beyond the collective. Their “national” security was that of the CIS. The two bulwarks of that security were to be a unified command and a collective security agreement. The member states saw no need (nor did they acknowledge their innate inability) to create independent armed forces.

Cracks in the System.

Serious problems soon occurred in both the unified command structure and the collective security agreement. Indeed, initial debate over the nature of CIS armed forces mirrored core arguments over the nature of the Commonwealth itself and the role of the Russian Federation as *de facto* leader.⁶ Article 6 of the agreement to form a commonwealth envisioned a common strategic- military space under a unified command, including unitary control over nuclear weapons, but refrained from specifics. Most Central Asian states assumed that some type of unified defense structure would replace the Soviet High Command, but manning, mission, and deployment would remain basically the same.

Moscow’s proposed structure for the armed forces’ unified command immediately put the issues of equality and sovereignty into question. Two schools emerged. The first⁷ accepted the need to decentralize both control over and ownership of the new republican armed forces. Republican forces would be subordinate to their respective defense ministries and heads of state, not the CIS.⁸ The other school⁹ rejected any power sharing and envisioned a truly unified (*edinyye*) armed forces—reflecting the attitude that the CIS was merely the USSR with new letterhead paper and that “the republics had commitments and obligations, not rights of ownership and control.”¹⁰ The final compromise created two CIS commands: one for the Combined Strategic Armed Forces such as nuclear weapons, strategic air forces,

etc., and a Joint Supreme High Command bureaucracy in Moscow to control the remainder.¹¹

When the CIS Joint Command failed, it was not unexpected. The Russian Federation (even though it had retracted to Muscovy's borders of the 1650s) regarded itself as the successor state to the USSR. As such, it assumed ownership of strategic assets and expected the other states to accept its lead. As the reality of independence set in, the new republics began to refuse to fall into this subordinate relationship. Eight states agreed on a common military oath for CIS strategic forces, but Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refrained.¹² Commissions set to consider the fate of the Caspian Sea Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet ran into major obstacles as states demanded their part of the pie instead of total return of all assets to Moscow.¹³ Ukraine began to question Unified Command (that is, Moscow's) control over nuclear weapons on its territory. Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova announced their intent to create their own armed forces and opt out of a Unified Command, regardless of which structure was approved.¹⁴ After 18 months the joint command was dissolved, and a smaller CIS Joint Staff with reduced responsibilities replaced it.¹⁵ The strategic forces commander position was abolished, and the position of "Chief of the Joint Staff for CIS Military Coordination" was created in its place.¹⁶

The Tashkent Security Agreement.

Even with a unified command infrastructure, the states understood that "what was once a single strategic space was broken up, and today none of the newly formed states is capable of fully solving the problem of its own security through its own efforts alone."¹⁷ Collective security was the solution, but early efforts to produce a collective security pact were unsuccessful. The Tashkent summit of May 1992 was a make-or-break meeting for the CIS. The first three CIS summits of 1992 in Moscow (January 16), Minsk (February 14), and Kiev (March 20) had failed to create a

consensus on the form and substance of the new armed forces or to reach any agreement on a general CIS military budget, “the bedrock on which any significant CIS military structure would have to stand.”¹⁸ Then, in a single day (May 15, 1992) in Tashkent, the attending heads of states adopted 13 documents.¹⁹ Most important was the signing of a collective security accord, although it was predominantly a political-military rather than a military agreement. They also agreed on the joint use of airspace and of the Baikonur and Plesetsk space-vehicle launching sites and reaffirmed their desire to have border troops under a unified command. They agreed to fulfill the USSR’s commitments with respect to international treaties on chemical weapons and the reduction of armed forces. Finally, they laid the groundwork for CIS peacekeeping forces, to be used only with the consent of *all* sides involved in a given conflict.

From the beginning, however, the agreements did not produce a *CIS* collective security environment. The Tashkent Accord (signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on May 15) more resembled a *Central Asian* security pact than a *CIS* security agreement. For varying reasons, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Moldova did not accede to the document.²⁰ Without Ukrainian participation, initial Russian interest waned. The treaty did not go into effect for nearly 2 years, and even then, bureaucratic, financial, and legislative barriers have blocked implementation of some provisions altogether. The treaty did not fulfill its political goal of preventing the process of military disintegration and restoring mutual trust among the signatories.

The treaty also fell short of its military goals. Article 4 of the treaty provides for joint repulsion of “aggression,” but does not set criteria that demand action. As such, Armenia was unsuccessful in gaining signatories’ support repelling alleged transgressions during its struggle with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Until Karimov of Uzbekistan protested and threatened unilateral action, the treaty was

not even invoked to deal with cross-border incursions from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.²¹

Even when countries acted, their response was limited. Under provisions of the accord, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan did eventually supplement Russian forces in Tajikistan, but troop numbers were small in comparison. Central Asian states preferred to let Russian forces bear the brunt of the burden of peacekeeping (or peacemaking) in the region; they were also still unable to support deployed forces beyond their own borders.

Acknowledging that the “times when a single viewpoint [could be] foisted on everyone are gone,”²² Boris Yeltsin proclaimed that Russia must look toward the creation of its own national forces and seek to assure Commonwealth security through bilateral ties with individual CIS members as well.²³ Such a sentiment was reluctantly endorsed, in turn, by the Central Asian republics.²⁴ The states of Central Asia did not want to form independent armed forces and were among the strongest advocates of maintaining some type of unified command under Moscow.

The reluctance of the Central Asian states to undertake the creation of their own militaries is not surprising, given their lack of a significant ethnic officer corps on which to draw, their interest in dedicating scarce economic resources to more pressing needs, and their general appreciation that they cannot effectively ensure their security independently.²⁵

Nevertheless, once the Russian Federation decided to opt for a national force, one by one the other CIS states were forced to form their own as well.

Interest remains in greater economic cooperation, but (aside from air defense) the CIS military structure is moribund. As one analyst noted, “the only question is whether to keep the respirator going.”²⁶

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES

Each Central Asian state, therefore, has been forced to develop national armed forces from the leftovers of the Soviet Armed Forces. Each has faced serious challenges while attempting to mold armed forces to meet its particular needs, defend its borders, safeguard its citizens, and protect its national security. Creation of armed forces has had less to do with identification of threats to national sovereignty and molding an armed forces to meet those threats, than “making do” with what was left over from the Soviet Army. Let us first examine that Soviet legacy and then trace the challenges confronting each state in the formation of indigenous armed forces. While many problems were common, each state had to confront its own security demands, perceived threats, geopolitical position, economic dislocation, cadre resources, ethnic strife, and political sensitivities. As a result, the ability of the countries to field viable armed forces has been uneven, and states have been forced to find other means to secure their sovereignty.

SOVIET LEGACY

The Soviet heritage of the Central Asian states has had a major impact on each republic’s armed forces. The primary factor molding Central Asian affairs is that the so-called Soviet Socialist Republics making up the Union, although given boundaries and state institutions mirroring that of Moscow, were never meant to be self-supporting states—politically, economically, or militarily. Each state is supposedly the homeland of its titular minority (e.g., Kazakhs in Kazakhstan), but in reality, the “nation states” of Central Asia suffer from the dysfunction that occurs when territorial and ethnic boundaries do not coincide.²⁷ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not exist prior to the drawing of Soviet republican boundaries. Stalin’s “cartographic exercises” purposefully cut across nationalities, to “divide and

conquer”; borders were drawn deliberately to generate internal ethnic tensions, to make each republic a sort of *Matreshka* doll with minorities inside minorities—all dependent on Moscow.²⁸ Central authorities meant these borders as internal administrative control mechanisms; no one dreamed the Soviet Socialist Republics would ever become actual states. As a result, boundaries, drawn to fit Stalin’s political purposes, did not match key terrain or bind nations together.

All ties were vertical to Moscow; there was no horizontal integration within Central Asia. Politically, each Soviet Socialist Republic possessed a legislative and executive infrastructure and a republican Communist Party chief, appointed by Moscow, who became the *de facto* ruler when the Soviet Union fell apart. There was no comparable republican-level economic infrastructure to fall back upon. Economically, the Central Asian economies were part of the command economy run by the Five Year Plans, driven by decisions from the center in Moscow, fed by a unified power system, and funded by a common currency.²⁹ When this system broke up, it created great dislocation and financial upheaval.

The republics possessed no independent military structures, e.g., similar to the British Territorial Army system, the German *Wehrkreis*, or an American state’s National Guard. Soviet strategic considerations drove the alignment of men, equipment, and materiel to the region called “Soviet Central Asia.”³⁰ Two military districts, the Turkestan and Central Asian,³¹ provided the peacetime infrastructure and wartime command and control for army, navy, and air force units stationed in the region. Their missions shaped the disposition, location, and manning of Soviet units, garrisons, and facilities. The broad expanse of desert and distant mountain ranges housed the Soviet space center, nuclear test areas, research facilities for chemical and biological warfare, strategic missile silos, top secret research installations, and huge quantities of materiel moved beyond the “Atlantic to the Urals” (ATTU) treaty

zone delineated under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.³² Yet it was pretty much “luck of the draw,” the result of decisions by Moscow’s bureaucrats, where troops, training sites, and installations were located. Soviet security needs, not republican interests, shaped their deployment.

Another prominent factor is what Dr. Jacob Kipp calls the Soviet Union’s “multiple militaries.” In Soviet terms, “armed forces” refers not only to troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but to a variety of *other* military forces subordinate to *other* agencies, to include internal security forces (MVD), committees of state security (KGB), railroad troops, praetorian guards assigned to the Presidency, border forces, etc.

Finally, Soviet post-World War II manpower policy affected the development of Central Asian militaries.³³ Moscow regarded military service as a tool to socialize ethnic minorities, teach them Russian, break down nationalist loyalties, submit them to political training, and create the “New Soviet Man.”³⁴ Ethnic Russians made up barely half of the Soviet population but predominated in high technology services (such as the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Forces) and security forces (e.g. the KGB Border Guards). Slavs, especially Eastern Ukrainians, dominated the career noncommissioned officer ranks. Slavs also made up nearly 95 percent of the officer corps, although very limited numbers of non-Slavic officers reached general officer rank. Combat units included all 120-plus ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, but Central Asians increasingly found themselves segregated in noncombat support units such as construction battalions or internal security forces.³⁵ The victims of racial bias, Central Asian minorities often found themselves the victims of *dedovshchina* (hazing by senior conscripts) and barracks-slang ethnic slurs.

Each of the Central Asian republics has had to deal with this legacy as it shaped an independent armed force. The republics have met with relative degrees of success.

TAJIKISTAN—RUSSIA'S BLACK HOLE?

Tajikistan's armed forces have been the least successful; they failed to defend the regime during the initial succession crisis and, as a result, the country was wracked by civil war and cross-border incursions for half a decade.

Tajikistan's early days were similar to those of its neighbors: independence declared following the 1991 Moscow coup; a new government formed under the former communist leader, Nabyev; security advisors to the president identified; and a National Guard created (December 24, 1991).³⁶ The most significant decision to shape Tajikistan's early forces was Dushanbe's declaration that the main Russian force deployed in Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), would *not* be nationalized to form the basis of the new Tajik Armed Forces. A subsequent visit by Russian Defense Minister Grachev confirmed that the division would not be disbanded or withdrawn, although local recruitment would increase the proportion of ethnic Tajiks and all Russians serving would be on contract.³⁷ Instead, the 201st MRD would remain in Tajikistan until at least 1999 in *support* of the Tajik Army.³⁸

Without that trained, well-equipped core, Tajikistan was forced to rely on leftovers to form its conventional forces, and leftovers they were: a mixture of internal security, local militia (police), and KNB (KGB successor) troops. The first five "battalions" were also unconventional, formed from paramilitary Popular Front volunteers.³⁹ The Tajik legislature could not resolve the real issues stymieing development of operational forces: a shortage of experienced ethnic Tajik officers and noncommissioned officers, reliance on Russian training facilities (of the 201st MRD), the inability to enforce conscription, a nonexistent military doctrine, and (the most crucial issue) lack of funds to pay for such forces.⁴⁰

Efforts to create conventional forces in 1992 were overwhelmed by the political, ethnic, and religious tensions that were tearing the country apart: regional economic disparities, breakaway provinces, fighting between southern Uzbek and northern Tajik factions, radical Islamic groups, and cross-border incursions by Afghan mujahedin, arms dealers, and drug smugglers.⁴¹ The resultant bloodshed left over 50,000 dead and a half-a-million more homeless refugees.

Any real efforts to create a genuine armed forces awaited the appointment of (ethnic Russian) Colonel Alexander Shishlyannikov as Defense Minister in January 1993.⁴² With Russian assistance, he gradually built a small force of around 7,000 men who were organized into two motorized rifle brigades, one mountain brigade, and one Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Regiment.⁴³ This force, however, was too small and poorly trained to ensure Tajikistan's security.

Failure to produce viable armed forces has produced a security policy totally dependent upon the willingness of other states to accept responsibility for Tajikistan and to expend men, money, and materiel to prop it up. The continued existence of the Rakhmanov regime depended upon military support from the Russian Federation and fellow Central Asian CIS members.

The Rakhmonov regime came to rely upon two external armed forces: the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan (GRBTT) and the Joint CIS Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan.⁴⁴ Tajikistan lacks resources to maintain forces along its 2,000-kilometer border. During the CIS Kiev summit in March 1992, Tajikistan confirmed that Russian Border Guards would maintain Dushanbe's borders. In late August 1992 a reorganization of former-Soviet border forces districts occurred, and jurisdiction for the "southern border of the CIS" was transferred to the GRBTT. Their mission is challenging, for as one observer has noted,

Those soldiers dispatched to protect Tajikistan from "terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists," also became policemen charged

with detaining drug runners, as well as immigration officers dealing with returning refugees—and one person crossing the border could easily be a terrorist, drug runner, and refugee all at once. The border guards are poorly paid, serve in territory better known to their opponents, and are surrounded by trouble . . .⁴⁵

After 6 years of local recruitment, however, the term “Russian” border forces refers more to its chain of command than its ethnic composition. Of the GRBTT’s approximately 18,000 men, today about 12,000 are Tajik. The remainder are made up of some 4,000 Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians and some 2,000 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks.⁴⁶

Since May 1994, Russian border forces have been complemented by a small “Border Troops of the Republic of Tajikistan” to support the GRBTT. The three border brigades then formed (and a fourth in 1995) are used independently in rear areas and jointly with Russian forces in the mountain regions. Tajik border guards are commanded by a Russian officer. Given the choice, however, over 80 percent of Tajik officers and warrant officers choose duty in the Russian border troops because of the better pay rather than service in their own national forces.⁴⁷

The second external force to provide security to Rakhmonov’s regime has been the CIS Collective Peace-keeping Force in Tajikistan (CCPFT), created under the collective security provisions of the Tashkent accord after nearly a year of wrangling. The original mission of the force (to be comprised of one reinforced Russian battalion, two Uzbek, one Kazakh and one Kyrgyz battalions) was to conduct operations “to allow the new leadership in Tajikistan to take the situation under control and stop the excesses of gangs.”⁴⁸ It was to separate warring factions and safeguard the newly appointed coalition government. Indeed, the 201st MRD was not part of the originally designated force and was tasked to guard key installations and military facilities.

The Agreement on Collective Peacekeeping Forces signed on September 24, 1993, by Russia and four Central Asian states (Turkmenistan abstained) formally established the Joint Command of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces and authorized it to implement decisions taken by the heads of respective states regarding the use of these forces. Appendix 2 specified that Russia would provide only 50 percent of the collective forces. However, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan failed to provide troops other than limited forces for border duty.⁴⁹ The 201st MRD was drawn into the CCPFT once the magnitude of the mission and the lack of resources became apparent. It was not until October 1993 that an actual CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force was finally dispatched to Tajikistan.⁵⁰ Russian troops from the 201st MRD were joined by limited contingents from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; all were commanded by a Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

Thus Tajikistan has remained totally dependent on outside sources for its physical security. However, recent political breakthroughs have altered this situation. In April 1996, Tajikistan (along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) signed the Shanghai Accord to settle on-going border disputes with China. This relieved the need for extensive border forces along the eastern border. Second, the Tajik government in Dushanbe signed a peace accord (the General Agreement of National Reconciliation and Peace Establishment) in Moscow on June 27, 1997, with Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic opposition.⁵¹ If parliamentary elections are held and the secular opposition is brought into the reconciliation process, the need for external forces to provide security will dwindle. It is likely that Dushanbe would then ask for a reduction in Russian troop strength in country (or at least a decrease in their visibility). It is likely that Moscow, which has long regarded Tajikistan as a black hole sucking it dry, will welcome such an initiative.

These developments will not necessarily be followed by a comparable build-up of Tajik armed forces, especially in a period when the financial demands of sheltering returning refugees, reinvigorating a shattered economy, and reasserting domestic reins of power will take precedence. The Tajik armed forces did not provide security in the past; Dushanbe will not pump them up to provide security in the future. Instead, if the reconciliation government is successful, it will most likely attempt to integrate itself into other Central Asian political, economic, and military mechanisms, rather than trying to “go it alone” once Russia’s patronage is diminished.⁵² For example, Rakhmonov in January met with the other four Central Asian leaders in Ashgabat during which he worked to patch up grievances with Uzbekistan and discussed common concerns regarding the inter-Tajik settlement, the situation on the Afghan-Tajik border, the status of Russian troops in Tajikistan, and regional security.⁵³ Dushanbe will be “behind the power curve” of regional integration but can benefit from the previous labors of its neighbors.

KYRGYZSTAN—FROM REASONABLE INSUFFICIENCY TO REGIONAL PARTNER?

Kyrgyzstan has always been a reluctant republic. It declared sovereignty on December 12, 1990, the last Central Asian republic to do so; in the all-union referendum on preserving the union (held in March 1991) 95 percent of voters (93 percent turnout) supported the union.⁵⁴ The new government in Bishkek originally made little effort to establish a national military force, signing the Tashkent Accord, giving strong support to the CIS unified command movement, and relying on Russia’s 40th Army (headquartered in Almaty) to fund ex-Soviet forces in Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁵ Bishkek issued a decree establishing the Kyrgyz Armed forces only (according to one official) when “in May 1992 Akayev received a telegram from [CIS Defense Minister] Shaposhnikov telling him to take control of the

forces on Kyrgyz territory because the center would no longer pay for them.”⁵⁶

China was Bishkek’s major perceived threat because of long-standing border disputes dating back to tsarist land grabs and concerns over the treatment in China’s Xinjiang province of ethnic Uighers who share an ethnic and religious (Muslim) heritage with the Kyrgyz. Territorial concerns waned with the signing of the border agreement in April 1997, which included a number of confidence-building measures and troop reductions within a 100-kilometer-wide border area.⁵⁷ Transnational threats continued, however, from international drug smugglers, arms traffickers, and refugees fleeing Tajikistan. Continued unrest in Afghanistan and the specter of politicized Islam (especially from the newly-emerging Taliban) were also seen as threatening.

A small set of issues within Central Asia also existed over which Kyrgyzstan could come to blows with its neighbors, the most contentious being water rights.⁵⁸ All Central Asian water flows from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two states argue that it is a “strategic product” that they have the right to control, sell, or trade. It is not their fault, they say, that Soviet policies created ecological catastrophes “too late to solve” elsewhere in the region. “Uzbekistan’s problems with the Aral Sea are not Kyrgyzstan’s problem.”⁵⁹ But Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors challenge the assertion that it has the right to decide where and when water should flow. The water issue may prove to be the powderkeg of 21st century security affairs in the region.

Therefore, immediate attention when forming armed forces focused on border guards, next on Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces, and then on internal security troops. At independence, the “Kyrgyz Border Guards Command” (subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and commanded by a Kyrgyz general officer) administratively replaced the Kirghiz (Kyrgyz) Directorate of the former Central Asian Border Troops district of the USSR KGB. But this was an

act on paper, not a recognition of Kyrgyzstan's ability to defend its borders. Seven years later, the actual responsibility still rests on Russian shoulders. In 1992, when Almaty took over the ex-Soviet Eastern Border District, Bishkek found the Border Troops on Kyrgyz territory were without leadership, support, or even medical supplies. Bishkek appealed to Moscow for help and under an October 1992 bilateral treaty, Russia assumed responsibility for guarding Kyrgyzstan's borders. A "joint" Kyrgyz-Russian Border Troops Command was established, commanded by a Russian,⁶⁰ to patrol only the border with China—not along "internal" CIS borders. The Group of Russian Border Guards in Kyrgyzstan works for Kyrgyzstan (but subordinate to the Russian Federal Border Guard Service), financed 80 percent by Moscow and 20 percent by Bishkek. Border guards serve under contracts set by a 5-year agreement with Moscow, although as the result of recent recruitment, more than 60 percent of the inductees into the "Russian" border forces are ethnic Kyrgyz.⁶¹

Kyrgyzstan announced plans for conventional forces to include Ground forces and an Air Force/Air Defense Command and a National Guard to provide internal security.⁶² Kyrgyz Armed Forces were originally (1992) comprised of one division (one tank, one artillery, and one infantry regiment) headquartered in Bishkek;⁶³ one independent brigade for mountain warfare headquartered in Osh; and three aviation training regiments.⁶⁴ The army forces have survived, but the aviation training regiments have collapsed as Bishkek failed to maintain the Soviet Union's pilot training program for foreign students.

Bishkek's primary military problem is cadre. Once the unified command concept collapsed, Kyrgyzstan set up regulations to create a conscript force of nearly 20,000—a target it has not been able to meet. Within a year it was apparent that these plans were overly ambitious, but Kyrgyzstan remained ambivalent about the structure and size of its conventional forces. Today's conscript force of

12,000 men serves only in Kyrgyzstan. It is difficult to find enough qualified officers to lead even that small number. Of 4,000 Soviet officers stationed in Kyrgyzstan “at the inception,” about 90 percent were ethnic Russian. Not one regimental commander and only one battalion commander were ethnic Kyrgyz. Bishkek appointed an ethnic Kyrgyz as its first Defense Minister,⁶⁵ but the Chief of the Main Staff was Russian. Additional appointments included experienced Russian and Ukrainian officers, with many Kyrgyz officers appointed to deputy positions. Around 1,700 Kyrgyz officers were serving outside Kyrgyzstan in 1991, many of whom returned to serve in the new Kyrgyz forces.⁶⁶ An interstate treaty allows Russian soldiers to serve in the Kyrgyz armed forces on a contractual basis through the end of 1999. A 1994 agreement enabled contract Russians to transfer to Russian or Kyrgyz service “without any obstacles.”⁶⁷ These provisions, however, have failed to halt the hemorrhaging exit of skilled officers following the collapse of the Kyrgyz economy.

For Kyrgyzstan, financing its own armed forces has been truly daunting both in planning and execution. As one minister noted, “in the past our job was to gather up the money, send it to Moscow and keep the troops fed.” Independent Kyrgyzstan has had to support forces on its own territory, including retired officers’ pensions, from its own budget.⁶⁸ Financial considerations have been a major factor in the sharp cut of personnel. Bishkek was woefully dependent upon the defense sector. With the end of the Cold War, this market collapsed. Russia would not buy from Kyrgyz suppliers. This comes at a time when Bishkek also faces up to \$300 million in loans to Russia. Kyrgyzstan has had to “sell” much of its defense sector to Russia to pay off the loans—Moscow could well soon own a majority of the industrial base in Kyrgyzstan as a result. Under such a situation, there is little defense budget to pay for military development—and priority goes to paying for border forces.⁶⁹

What are the consequences for Kyrgyzstan's security of "outsourcing" border defense to the Russians and downsizing conventional armed forces?⁷⁰ In a sense Kyrgyzstan originally went beyond (actually below) "reasonable sufficiency"—the Soviet doctrine which argued that a state develop sufficient means to defend itself but not alarm its neighbors—to "reasonable insufficiency"—insufficient means to defend but so little national power that neighbors ignore you altogether for more profitable targets.

Kyrgyzstan is tied economically and militarily to Russia. It has allowed itself to be drawn into Russia's fold by joining the Quadripartite Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) because it is landlocked and is isolated from major trade routes. It hopes that the new arrangement will be a practical move to avoid customs taxes and retain access to Russian markets.⁷¹ Kyrgyzstan has deferred to Moscow in all major security and economic arrangements because it felt it had little choice.

That has recently begun to change. Kyrgyzstan has not built up its armed forces and remains militarily weak, but it has begun working with its more powerful Central Asian neighbors to compensate for that insufficiency and provide national security independent of Russia. Kyrgyzstan has slowly moved beyond dependency to Moscow in an effort to avoid total subordination and because its most potent threat was eliminated by the April 1997 agreement with China. By the end of the decade, Bishkek has begun to bind itself to its two most powerful Central Asian neighbors—Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—politically, economically, and militarily on a trilateral and bilateral basis.

At the regional level, Bishkek helped form the tri-national Central Asian Battalion (CENTRAZBAT) being offered to the United Nations (U.N.) for peacekeeping duties.⁷² Kyrgyzstan joined Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in a trilateral customs union, signed the treaty on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Matters,⁷³ and joined them in the International Asian Investment Bank.

Bishkek participates in tripartite biannual meetings of heads of state, prime ministers, and defense chiefs.

Bishkek also has signed bilateral accords with both states. In December 1996, Tashkent and Bishkek concluded an eternal friendship accord and signed agreements on military cooperation, hydroelectricity, natural gas deliveries, a highway linking Uzbekistan to China, and combating drug trafficking.⁷⁴ Six months later Almaty and Bishkek signed a series of agreements to create a joint energy pool, finish building hydroelectric plants in Kyrgyzstan, join uranium-processing efforts, and supply Kyrgyzstan with oil; the two presidents then signed a treaty on military cooperation establishing a common defense and border space and providing for a joint air defense system, cooperation between border units, and joint exercises.⁷⁵

This regional integration is not without difficulties. Bishkek does not want to be dependent on Moscow, but it is tied to Russia through the CIS and the Quadripartite Customs Union and still acknowledges Moscow to be the “main strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan.”⁷⁶ Unresolved tensions exist within the region. Many Kyrgyz distrust the ambitions of emerging power Uzbekistan with which Kyrgyzstan shares the volatile Fergana valley. Memories also linger of bloody riots in 1990 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, involving ethnic Uzbeks, in which hundreds if not over a thousand people may have lost their lives. It was easier before independence to direct disfavor and blame against the Soviet Union than it is to find common ground once that target disappears.

KAZAKHSTAN—PROMISE UNFULFILLED?

Is there a basis for Kazakhstan to form its own army? Is there sufficient finance, a sufficient material and technical base, and sufficient personnel for this? What is the level of preparation of national cadres, and what is their present function in the army? . . . Under present circumstances, three preconditions must be met to form a well-prepared, complete army. They are finance,

weapons and cadre. If any one is lacking the army will be an incomplete army.⁷⁷

Baqtier Yerimet,
February 14, 1992

On paper, Kazakhstan had the greatest potential of becoming a military power following independence. The largest Central Asian state (2,717,000 square kilometers), Almaty inherited nuclear weapons and substantial stores of military equipment and hardware from the Soviet Army. Major test facilities and the Baikonur space center were located in Kazakhstan. The country was rich in mineral and energy resources, especially oil.⁷⁸ Its population of 17 million included 8-10 million ethnic Russians living predominantly in the industrialized north. Yet, 7 years later Kazakhstan struggles to build its armed forces, and economic and political weaknesses have increasingly drawn it, too, into Russia's embrace.⁷⁹

Although drastically different in size and power, Kazakhstan shares many common problems with Kyrgyzstan to include transnational threats from drug smuggling, potential spillover from the war in Tajikistan, and fear of politicized Islam and regional instability from the Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan.⁸⁰ Kazakhs make up only 40 percent of its population, with another 40 percent Russian (although a declining number), and the rest a mishmash of other Slavic, Central Asian, and Asian minorities. Russian nationalists (e.g., Solzhenitsyn) talk of breaking away northern Kazakhstan and returning it to Mother Russia (where it belonged for centuries before Stalin's pen sliced it away). Therefore, Kazakhstan's security demands resemble a Rubik's Cube of ever-changing patterns and combinations in which border defense, internal security, and conventional forces' development cannot be prioritized but demand equal, if fluctuating, attention.

Almaty's original assumption was that someone else would be responsible for sorting this all out. Kazakhstan did

not seek independence in 1991. Indeed, President Nazarbayev's call for a summit in Almaty to avoid independence was a major element in forcing the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to include the Central Asian republics in the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kazakhstan was very reluctant to give up the idea of a CIS unified command and form its own armed forces.⁸¹ Soon after declaring independence on December 6, 1991, Nazarbayev established a National Security Council to formulate legislation and doctrine directly affecting national security.⁸² A presidential decree of April 16, 1992, transferred the bulk of the ex-Soviet 40th Army to the jurisdiction of the Kazakhstani government, which redesignated it the "All-Arms Army" within the context of a CIS unified command.

Outside events forced Nazarbayev's hand. On May 8, 1992, one day after Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of the Russian Army (thus ending for all intents and purposes any hope for a unified CIS command system), Nazarbayev declared himself Commander-in-Chief of the "Armed Forces of Kazakhstan" and established a Defense Ministry. The State Security Council became the supreme decision-making body for national defense doctrine, security policy, and senior military appointments under the chairmanship of President Nazarbayev.⁸³ Almaty placed ground forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval units⁸⁴ under the Ministry of Defense. Initial planning envisioned that conscript forces should be at least 0.5 percent of the national population (c. 83,000) but a shortage of funds and an inability to enforce conscription consistently forced Almaty to halve that amount. Current manning totals around 35,000 (ground forces, 20,000; air forces, 15,000; and naval forces, 100).⁸⁵

Restructuring of the internal security apparatus also proceeded slowly. Nazarbayev created the Republican Guard in March 1992, making it directly subordinate to himself. The first two (of six) battalions were mustered in

April 1992;⁸⁶ it now numbers approximately 2,500 men.⁸⁷ A month later he designated a Kazakhstani Minister for Internal Affairs, and Moscow transferred control of the ex-Soviet Internal Troops to him for the mission of maintaining public order and suppressing public disturbances.⁸⁸ Internal security forces now number around 20,000.⁸⁹

Initially Kazakhstan envisioned its own border forces under the National Security Committee (the indigenous-KGB successor) guarding its 1,718 kilometer-long external border. It nationalized the Border Guard Academy (located in Almaty) and accepted technical training assistance from Russia. Before long, however, it was evident these forces were inadequate to stem the flow of drugs, weapons, and refugees crossing the region, and that Almaty lacked the resources to increase the size of its own forces. Kazakhstan was forced to follow the path of other Central Asian neighbors and accept the presence of Russian border forces along its external border. By May 1995, however, Kazakh border forces, now subordinated to a new State Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Protection of State Borders⁹⁰ (and assisted by a small [more administrative than operational] "Group of Russian Border Troops in Kazakhstan"), assumed responsibility for border security.⁹¹

Kazakhstan's trump card was its inherited nuclear weapons and delivery systems. However, any thoughts of retaining Soviet nuclear weapons were short-lived. Almaty lacked the funds and technical expertise to maintain and safeguard the weapons. It could not easily integrate nuclear weapons with its own military forces. Public revulsion at the disastrous impact of various Soviet nuclear test sites on the environment and health of the Kazakhstani population could not be ignored. So instead, Almaty adopted a policy of denuclearization and nonproliferation to divest itself of the 104 SS-18 missiles (ten warheads each) and 40 Tu-95 MS strategic bombers (with 370 nuclear bombs) inherited upon independence and transferred them to Russia.⁹²

Kazakhstan's basic approach to security is to avoid confrontation and to seek out collective security partners. Almaty's earliest security doctrine declared that no state was its enemy, denied territorial claims on any of its neighbors, and promised inviolability of existing borders.⁹³ Doctrine stresses that although there is no specific "threat," territorial, economic, religious, ethnic, or other tensions could escalate to war. Regional instability and build-up of military potential by some nations (to include weapons of mass destruction) remain sources of potential danger. Kazakhstan must not confront these threats by itself, but find collective security within the CIS through joint utilization of strategic forces, a system of comprehensive logistical and rear support, common efforts to train and retain officer cadres, joint research and development of military armaments, and development of a joint military science and military art.⁹⁴

Unfortunately, the early hopes for CIS military integration and cooperation remain basically unfulfilled 7 years later, hampered by a lack of funds and a Russian habit of signing documents without executing them.⁹⁵ As a result, although Kazakhstan remains in the CIS military structure, it has sought alternative security partners to help resolve the serious problems encountered in developing conventional armed forces.

The critical shortage of national cadres remains a key problem and deterrent to progress. At independence, 97 percent of Soviet officers in Kazakhstan were Russian. The number of active duty Kazakh officers of all ranks in the entire Soviet Army numbered only about 3,000, "not enough to wash one's hands with."⁹⁶ There was not a single Kazakh general commanding a division, army, or military district among them; colonels numbered only about 50, mostly in support roles.⁹⁷

Kazakhstan selected a distinguished ethnic Kazakh to become the first Defense Minister,⁹⁸ but his original deputy defense ministers were Russian officers. As they departed,

Kazakhstan had to seek out bright young Kazakh colonels and promote them to general rank. Elderly General Nurmagambetov was replaced as Defense Minister in October 1995, by 41-year-old Lieutenant General Ailibek Kasymov, a graduate of the Frunze Academy and former Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, who had served since November 1992 as Chief of the Main Staff.⁹⁹ But, the shortage of experienced, capable officers at all levels remains a serious brake on military development.

Moscow did attempt to assist Almaty in stopping this exodus; in July 1993 Moscow amended its Law on Conscription and Military Service to allow Russian officers and warrant officers serving in other republic's militaries to retain legal rights envisaged under Russian laws and freed them from the obligation to take Kazakh citizenship or swear an oath until December 31, 1993; this was later extended to December 31, 1999.¹⁰⁰ The outflow continued, however, in part due to Russian perception that although the Russians made up the majority of officers, only ethnic Kazakhs were being promoted to the rank of general and Russian resentment at serving under senior Kazakh officers whose "rampant incompetence" resulted from "promotions based on the factor of ethnicity and capability for political maneuvering rather than expertise. . . . It is not surprising that more and more ethnic Russians are abandoning military service . . ." leading to cases where only 30-40 percent of the officer slots are filled.¹⁰¹

Military education remains a critical issue, especially for noncommissioned and junior officers. Kazakhstan fared better than some Central Asian states in the training facilities it inherited, although the number was still small: three military prep-schools, two military secondary schools (as opposed to 34 in Ukraine), and two ex-Soviet Army military schools—the Almaty Higher All-Arms Command School (only six Kazakhs among the faculty and 84 Kazakhs out of 1,000 students) and the Border Guards Academy.¹⁰² Under the September 1992 Russo-Kazakhstani Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance, Moscow agreed to

train 500 Kazakhstani officers per year at its various military academies.¹⁰³ Kazakhstani pilots and navigators are being trained at the Lepitsk Training Center in Russia.¹⁰⁴

Kazakhstan also has to face the question of language. Few of the 60 percent of non-Kazakh populace spoke Kazakh at independence, and the number of those ethnic Slavs making up the officer corps (even those born in Kazakhstan) who spoke Kazakh was especially low. The desire to push the Kazakh language was hindered not only by the embarrassing number of Russified Kazakh intellectuals who did not speak Kazakh, but by the knowledge that, until domestic military educational institutions could be established, personnel would have to continue to train in Russia—where they needed the Russian language.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, instructional materials, books, training manuals, and so forth, inherited from the Soviet Army were all in Russian.

Unable to exploit fully its energy resources or mend easily the dysfunctions following the breakup of the Soviet economic system, Kazakhstan has made hard decisions on allocating limited financial resources, and the armed forces have not come out the winner in budget battles. As a result, Kazakhstan has had to relinquish several valuable properties to Russian control that it had hoped to exploit, and it has signed a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to draw Kazakhstan closer to Russia. In May 1992 they signed an Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance by which they promised each other military assistance in case of aggression against either state.¹⁰⁶ In March 1994 they signed 22 agreements, to include the lease to Moscow of the Baikonur Cosmodrome (for an initial period of 20 years with an option to extend a further 10 years) for \$115 million annually (to be deducted from Almaty's debts to Russia). A January 1995 agreement gave Russia continued access to several missile test ranges, proving grounds, and military communications sites in Kazakhstan.¹⁰⁷ In January-

February 1995, Almaty and Moscow signed another series of bilateral agreements,¹⁰⁸ including an intent to “begin to form unified armed forces.” The states would not form a single armed force, but create a close alliance in which forces would be unified, when necessary, to face a common threat within a “mutual military and strategic space.”¹⁰⁹ That same year Kazakhstan joined the CIS integrated air defense system and conducted a joint Russo-Kazakh exercise.¹¹⁰ In January 1996, defense officials discussed joint military cooperation, a draft agreement on establishing a joint Russian-Kazakh regional security planning organization, a Treaty on Collective Security, closer cooperation in air defense and naval affairs, technological cooperation, exchange training programs, and the creation of joint Russian-Kazakh units, and then signed 16 agreements.¹¹¹

Talk of integrating Kazakhstan’s armed forces with those of Russia (even if only on paper) reflects a larger political and economic dependence. Kazakhstan possesses untapped mineral and energy wealth, but further exploitation will require extensive investment in the transportation infrastructure. Kazakhstan is landlocked, and in the early days there was no other option but to use Russian pipelines (with Moscow taking a huge cut off the top) to get energy to external markets. Almaty joined the Quadripartite Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan to gain access to Moscow’s international markets and reestablish trade ties disrupted by independence.¹¹²

However, this image of Kazakhstan being drawn into Russia’s sphere is less striking in reality. Execution of treaties remains spotty, including (6 years later) the Tashkent Accord. Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev visited Almaty in October 1997 to iron out tensions over Russia’s failure to meet payment schedules for facilities’ lease in Kazakhstan, and Kazakh nationalists’ protests over the presence of Russian forces in country.¹¹³ CIS support to form joint peacekeeping forces under Russian command in

Tajikistan was slow and limited, although Kazakhstan did provide one battalion to guard a 56-kilometer stretch of the Afghan-Tajik border.¹¹⁴ Kazakhstan has signed CIS agreements on the concept of military security (October 1993) and collective security (February 1995).¹¹⁵

Nazarbayev has sought to develop alternative security dialogues *within* Central Asia, first with his call for a Central Asian “Eurasian Union,” then with Kazakhstan’s leadership role in the economic, political, and military structures formed with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These efforts include the 1994 agreement to form a “single economic space” and an “economic integration program to the year 2000” signed in 1996. For example, the three planned to finance and build a gas pipeline linking the Bukhara gas-bearing region (across Kyrgyzstan) with Almaty. The program also includes construction of national segments of the Trans-Asia-Europe fiber-optic communications line being developed.¹¹⁶ The success of these endeavors is due (according to Russian analysts) to the fact that all signed documents are scrupulously implemented, problems are dealt with cooperatively, and none of the leaders publicly accuses another of nonfulfillment—common complaints about Russian-sponsored accords.¹¹⁷ That this union might evolve into military cooperation cannot be discounted.

Ties with immediate neighbors have also been developed. As a member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Kazakhstan (and the other Central Asian republics) seeks to improve ties with Islamic neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and develop economic cooperation and integration. Perhaps one day (at least in the eyes of some) ECO may transform itself from an economic union into a regional security forum (as has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN).

Almaty has also expanded its security contacts as a result of signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear power. Russia, the United States,

and Great Britain formally affirmed the security of Kazakhstan.¹¹⁸ China has also confirmed that its abstention from the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use against a non-nuclear state “applies to Kazakhstan.”¹¹⁹

Thus, Kazakhstan’s original aspiration to develop viable armed forces from the equipment and cadres inherited from Moscow remains a promise unfulfilled. However, Almaty has sought alternate political and economic means to ensure its national sovereignty. Nazarbayev was the earliest proponent of regional integration. Kazakhstan has taken a leading role in developing economic, political, and military ties with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

TURKMENISTAN—VICTORIAN GOVERNESS?

Turkmenistan seems to hope that in the short run it can avoid conflict by keeping a low profile—a sort of “Victorian Governess Syndrome.” In countless 19th century novels (pick any Bronte sister), the poor, unmarried governess or female relation keeps quiet in the background, dressing in dark colors to avoid attention, placating everyone, always helpful, avoiding the eldest son of the house, and praying that her very anonymity would ensure her continued residence. Except, of course, this governess knows that she is secretly the missing heiress, and at some point in the future she will come into a large fortune.

Turkmenistan is the second largest Central Asian state (488,000 square kilometers), but it has a population smaller than tiny Kyrgyzstan. Its porous borders to the south with Iran and Afghanistan and to the west with the Caspian Sea present a major security challenge to a country with only four million people (and an additional two million Turkmen residing over the border in war-torn Afghanistan). It, too, possesses potentially huge energy reserves (especially natural gas) and better access for pipelines and transport linkups *via* the reviving “Silk Route” tying it to China and Western Europe. Turkmenistan is unique, however, in its

role as Central Asia's maverick state, rejecting CIS protection in favor of nonalignment and a bilateral relationship with Moscow.

Following independence (October 27, 1991), the government in Ashgabat was a firm supporter of a CIS unified force until the pace of nationalization by Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova forced it to create a Turkmen Armed Forces organized into Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and a Naval Coastal Defense Force formed with the breakup of the Caspian Sea Flotilla. Of approximately 300 Soviet units stationed in Turkmenistan in December 1991, Moscow transferred about 200 to Turkmen control; these included the former Soviet Army Corps headquartered in Ashgabat (redesignated the Independent All-Arms Army in August 1992) with two all-arms divisions and an air defense brigade. By April 1993, about 60,000 soldiers were stationed inside Turkmenistan (based on the former Soviet 52d Army), only about one-fourth of whom were Russian, but financial problems and immigration have cut that number now to about 16,000-18,000.¹²⁰

Manpower shortages are compounded by ethnicity issues. Few Turkmen officers had reached senior rank within the Soviet Army or attended the senior service college. President Niyazov's senior appointees have strong backgrounds in security services rather than military experience, perhaps less an inability to identify and promote Turkmen field grade officers to general rank than a focus on security threats to his personal rule and a propensity for appointing old personal and Party friends to his immediate circle.

Military education has also been a problem. No military schools or officer academies existed in Turkmenistan upon independence. In the short term Ashgabat has sent some cadets abroad for training and educated other junior officers at a new Military Faculty of the Turkmen State University in Ashgabat. In September 1993 the first Turkmen Military

Academy opened in Ashgabat which offered a 4-year program to train armor, air force, logistics, and communications lieutenants. The first class of 75 lieutenants graduated from the Turkmen Military Academy during the summer of 1996; 200 graduated in 1997.¹²¹ No higher schools yet exist, but Ashgabat currently sends army officers abroad to Russia, Turkey, the United States, and Pakistan for additional training. Navy and Air Force officers attend schools in Ukraine, Pakistan and Turkey.¹²² Turkmenistan did not hold its first full-scale military exercise until October 1995.¹²³

Materiel remains a problem, although on paper the Turkmen Army possesses 500 T-72 tanks and the Turkmen Air Force has 171 operational fighters, trainers, and air defense aircraft on hand and 218 in storage.¹²⁴ But, "active" inventories do not reflect the impact of maintenance levels or spare parts availability. In fact, Turkmenistan has systematically disposed of excess Soviet equipment deployed or stockpiled on its territory, including some 500 of the 1,000 aircraft held in storage.¹²⁵

The president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, however, listening to his own "different drummer," has followed a unique path within Central Asia. Ashgabat set up its own Ministry of Defense Affairs (January 27, 1992) and created a ceremonial National Guard (October 1991), following the pattern of its neighbors. But after Turkmenistan refused to sign the CIS Accord, Niyazov replaced it with a bilateral Russo-Turkmen Agreement of July 1992 by which formations and units on Turkmen soil would be under Russo-Turkmen "joint jurisdiction." The Russian Defense Ministry would retain sole control over certain air defense and long-range bomber units; the Turkmen Defense Minister¹²⁶ would coordinate the activities of armed forces deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan, as well as liaison with the military departments of other CIS states and the CIS command.

This integrated joint command did not last long. Joint command ended in January 1994, although Russia retains a representative on Turkmenistan's Defense and National Security Council at the Turkmen MOD and the Commander of Russian Border Guard Forces.¹²⁷ By September 1993, Ashgabat had signed a bilateral agreement with Moscow to bring armed forces in Turkmenistan back under Ashgabat's control. The approximately 2,000 Russian officers in Turkmenistan could voluntarily continue to serve on a contract basis, but the majority left when their contracts ended.

With the failure of joint command, a series of bilateral agreements reaffirmed Moscow's role as partner and quasi-patron.¹²⁸ A naval agreement extended Russian use of facilities at Krasnovodsk for use by warships of both nations, promised creation of combined naval units, and proposed joint naval exercises. Both countries agreed to set up a training center for pilots and aviation technicians. A December 1993 agreement establishing the principle of "dual nationality" sought to ease the fears of serving Russian officers.¹²⁹ Ashgabat also signed a 1993 treaty providing the legal basis for the dispatch, if necessary, of Russian troops to defend Turkmenistan's border with Iran and Afghanistan.¹³⁰

Russia also assumed responsibility for protecting Turkmenistan's 2,300-kilometer border with Iran and Afghanistan. Ashgabat originally announced creation of its own border forces, but that proved too much for Turkmenistan's manpower and financial resources, given the porous nature of its southern border and civil war in Afghanistan.¹³¹ An August 27, 1992, Russo-Turkmen agreement on border cooperation placed all Russian and Turkmen border units under a provisional joint Russo-Turkmen Border Command to remain in effect for 5 years, during which Russia would assist in the development of indigenous border forces. This force, too, proved unable to control the spread of drugs and arms throughout the area; thus, in 1995, an "Operational Group of Russian Border Troops on the Territory of Turkmenistan" was established

to assist the Turkmen Border Troops along the southern border.¹³² Since January 1, 1994, Ashgabat has been paying the entire cost of Russia's military expenses on its territory.¹³³

Turkmenistan, however, is not a puppet of Moscow and has asserted its independence on several occasions. Turkmenistan signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia in September 1992—but only after Ashgabat refused to ratify the Tashkent collective security agreement that May.¹³⁴ Turkmenistan still has not ratified the treaty and is merely a “participant” without full rights. Ashgabat refuses to send delegates to CIS meetings except those concerning drugs and international crime. Since it did not approve the Tashkent Accord, Turkmenistan did not send peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan.

Instead, Turkmenistan identifies itself as a nonaligned nation, free and able to enter into associations with all states.¹³⁵ At the Helsinki summit in July 1992, Niyazov announced a policy of “positive neutrality,” noninterference in the affairs of others, and cooperation.¹³⁶ Niyazov even took this doctrine to the U.N. General Assembly, which in December 1995 approved a resolution on the “Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan.”¹³⁷ In his mind this perhaps resembles international guarantees for Belgium's neutrality in the 19th century. Niyazov appears to envision that Turkmenistan now possesses security guarantees through the United Nations. However, U.N. assurances are notoriously thin bonds upon which to stake national survival.

Under positive neutrality, Turkmenistan has been free to enter into a variety of military, political, and economic relationships. Niyazov has stated that Turkmenistan will not join any military bloc—but can continue to accept Russian military assistance without compromising its sovereignty or independence.¹³⁸ Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian state to join Partnership for Peace in May 1994 (although it has been slow to actually participate

in activities). Ashgabat also agreed to joint maneuvers with Iran and signed a series of military cooperation agreements with Teheran, including the “exchange of experience in the construction and development of armed forces” and the exchange of military delegations.¹³⁹ Turkmenistan has also explored economic and military ties with its neighbors in the Caucasus and Ukraine.

Ashgabat claims its policy is a success. Turkmenistan has experienced the least drop in its Gross Domestic Product since 1989; of course, it also had the lowest standard of living within the USSR in 1989. Nevertheless, the Turkmen argue that positive neutrality has allowed the country to invest “not in an enormous military arsenal, but in the construction of the civilian infrastructure that will eventually become the foundation of the national economy,” and has allowed it to maintain friendly relations simultaneously with the United States, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and France even as they disagree with each other.¹⁴⁰

In sum, recognizing that its small forces are incapable of protecting its vast expanse, Turkmenistan has sought limited bilateral support from Russia and security through its proclaimed nonaligned status. It has worked to develop the infrastructure needed to impress serious investors (a modern airport, hotels at international standard). Moscow wields considerable influence, but Ashgabat has attempted to ingratiate itself with all sides.

UZBEKISTAN—MALL ANCHOR STORE?

Uzbekistan has been the most successful of the Central Asian countries in creating viable armed forces and, as such, has produced the most independent security policy in Central Asia.

Tashkent created a Ministry of Defense Affairs and appointed the first Defense Minister in September 1991.¹⁴¹ On January 14, 1992, Uzbekistan assumed jurisdiction over

all former Soviet units and installations deployed on its soil, with the exception of those strategic forces retained under the CIS unified command. A National Border Guard force took over from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District, and a National Guard¹⁴² replaced former Soviet Interior (internal security) troops.¹⁴³ By July 1992, when it was apparent that a CIS unified command would not prevail, the Uzbek legislature approved a series of draft laws that laid the framework for the Uzbek military.¹⁴⁴ A new military oath to the “people” and President of the Republic of Uzbekistan was first administered in July 1992.¹⁴⁵

Conventional armed forces, numbering perhaps 65,000-70,000, under a MOD staff derived from the headquarters of the Soviet Army’s Turkestan Military District, are the largest in Central Asia. Forces include two corps headquarters; two tank divisions; four mechanized infantry divisions; motorized, air assault, and air mobile brigades; three artillery, and one multiple rocket launcher brigades; and an artillery regiment. Equipment includes 370 mostly older model main battle tanks and over 500 towed and self-propelled artillery systems. Nearly 130 combat aircraft and over 40 attack helicopters are in the Air Force inventory. Added to this are over 15,000 internal security forces and a National Guard brigade. This is a formidable force compared to the other Central Asian republics.¹⁴⁶

The Uzbeks are the lone force in Central Asia to develop a new force structure not based on the old Soviet model. In 1992 the Uzbeks began to reconfigure their ground forces into a corps-brigade-battalion structure for greater flexibility.¹⁴⁷ Initial planners envisioned two stages for force development: the first stage (1991 to 1994) to form the armed forces, install the conscription system, and begin reform of the force structure and personnel. A second stage (1995-2000) would finalize structural changes and bring the armed forces to an end strength of about 70,000.¹⁴⁸ That number has now been halved. The defense budget has been

hit by inflation, and although the absolute budget has increased, its actual value has been more than halved.¹⁴⁹ Uzbekistan did not inherit a self-sufficient industrial sector, but several major military complexes did survive, to include the Chkalov aviation factory producing the IL-76 CANDID (which Uzbekistan exports to China, Cuba, and Algeria) and passenger variants.¹⁵⁰

With the nationalization of Soviet forces, an overwhelmingly Slavic officer corps and predominantly Uzbek enlisted forces characterized the Uzbek army.¹⁵¹ But, that soon shifted as a result of Slavic migration, the Uzbek refusal to grant dual citizenship, and a concerted government program to put Uzbek officers in command.¹⁵² One means to acquire senior Uzbek officers was by rejuvenating the careers of a group of Uzbek officers whose Soviet Army careers seemingly had dead-ended in the 1980s. For example, Rustam Akhmedov, a lieutenant colonel with 24 years of service but shunted aside to Civil Defense, was promoted to Uzbek major general and appointed Defense Minister. Russians appointed as deputies (including the Army Chief of Staff) monopolized officer positions in the short term, but within a year, appointments became more balanced. Ethnic Slavs who remained accepted Uzbek citizenship. The officer corps is now about 60 percent Uzbek, and the percentage of enlisted conscripts at 85 percent make the Uzbek the most ethnically pure in the former Soviet Union.

Three major Soviet educational institutions (the Tashkent Higher All-Arms Command School, the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School, and the Samarkand Higher Military Automobile Command), four military *lyceum* prep-schools, and the Tashkent Special Military *Gymnasium* (Internat) located in Uzbekistan greatly helped this drive for self-sufficiency in manpower cadres. Then, in 1994 Uzbekistan established in Tashkent a new institution, the new Armed Forces Academy, a joint facility to train officers for brigade- and corps-level command and

staff assignments. It is the first such Central Asian institution capable of providing advanced military training.

Uzbekistan issued its own military doctrine in August 1995, in which Tashkent rejected territorial claims on its neighbors and claimed it would launch military actions only to defend itself or countries with whom it has mutual military assistance agreements.¹⁵³ It supports increasing the role of the United Nations, active integration into international and regional security structures, a universal prohibition of nuclear war (Central Asia should be a nuclear-free zone), elimination of chemical and biological weapons, and weapons nonproliferation.¹⁵⁴

Uzbekistan's military policy reflects a more assertive stance than its neighbors. Tashkent's new military doctrine argues that intervention in the affairs of neighboring states may be justified for the sake of regional stability, not an empty statement considering its willingness to use military power *vis-à-vis* Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the growth of the armed forces since independence.¹⁵⁵ Though defensive in nature and opposing war as a means to resolve international problems, Uzbekistan's doctrine calls for maintaining sufficient combat power to guarantee its territorial integrity, stop encroachments on its sovereignty, and repel aggression. In war, its armed forces would inflict a decisive *defeat* on both the aggressor's forces and on the joint military potential of other states linked by relevant treaties.¹⁵⁶ Such assertiveness worries other Central Asian states, which question Uzbekistan's long-term goals in the region and fear Tashkent's willingness to follow the so-called "Sinatra Doctrine," and do things *its* way.

Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state not to have an agreement with Russia on joint protection of its "external borders." The Uzbek Border Guard Force was first established on March 24, 1992, as "Border Protection Troops"¹⁵⁷ to fight smuggling, the drug trade, and the illegal transit of emigrants from Asia to Europe, especially in the region where Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan

meet.¹⁵⁸ A presidential decree created the Main Border Troops Directorate, headed by a Deputy Chief of the Republic's National Security Service (the former Uzbek Committee on State Security or KGB), and transferred all units of the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek National Security Service.¹⁵⁹ At independence the Border Guards' officer corps was overwhelmingly Slavic, but Tashkent aggressively produced indigenous forces by organizing special junior officers courses in which ethnic Uzbek privates, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and warrant officers underwent accelerated training and by creating a special border cadet group at the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School. The Termez border detachment and a border brigade with patrol boats guards the 156-kilometer, riverine border with Afghanistan. Of course, the shortness of the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border makes its defense more manageable and allows Uzbekistan to avoid having Russian border guards on its soil. Uzbekistan also mans 40 border posts along the border with Tajikistan.¹⁶⁰

The border Tashkent most fears is that with Tajikistan, which Tashkent regards as a dagger aimed at the heart of Uzbekistan.¹⁶¹ Tajikistan was originally part of Soviet Uzbekistan, and when its borders were drawn to create a separate Tajik state, large enclaves of Tajiks, including major cultural centers such as Samarkand and Bokhara, remained. With Kyrgyzstan, they share the Fergana Valley, a focus for religious revival and activism. Only 5 percent of Uzbekistan's population of 24 million is Tajik, while a quarter of Tajikistan's population of 6 million is ethnically Uzbek. Tashkent is determined to keep Tajikistan's unrest from spreading and has ruthlessly suppressed its own domestic political and religious dissent since Dushanbe's cycle of civil war, economic dislocation, ethnic strife, and external intervention began.

Karimov also identifies the Afghan wars as a real threat to peace and security in Central Asia and the world because they have become "a source of international terrorism,

drug-trafficking, and illegal arms trade, and further aggravated the already tense situation. . . .” In addition, civil war there stymied Central Asian states’ projects to build railroads, pipelines, and roads through Afghanistan to reach the Indian Ocean.¹⁶²

Karimov has not just talked about problems “to the South,” he has taken action.¹⁶³ Uzbekistan actively supported the ethnic Uzbek warlord Dostum in the Afghan struggle. It sent a 500-man contingent of peacekeepers to serve in Tajikistan. Where Moscow supports the Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe with military aid, Karimov long pushed the Tajik government to meet with the opposition to negotiate a political end to the trouble. Tension exists because Moscow regards Tajikistan as *its* problem to be solved, while Uzbekistan regards the area within its own sphere of interest.

Uzbekistan does not border Russia, and that may influence its ambivalent attitude toward Moscow. In the early days of independence, Tashkent was a strong supporter and ally of Russia. Uzbekistan signed bilateral agreements in May 1992 and March 1994 that granted Russia extensive privileges and promised to continue existing ties in the production and supply of weapons, equipment, spare parts, and accessories and to cooperate in exporting weaponry and military equipment.¹⁶⁴

However, Uzbekistan began to distance itself from Moscow at mid-decade. With Russia no longer a superpower and its military reputation tarnished in Chechnya, Moscow’s influence began to wane. In April 1995 President Karimov identified “imperialistic ambition rearing up in Russia” as one of three security issues that could derail Uzbekistan’s independence.¹⁶⁵ Uzbekistan refused to support Moscow’s rejection of NATO expansion and became strongly involved in Partnership for Peace. It has delayed signing recent trade and economic agreements with Moscow and has worked to develop transportation routes that bypass the Russian Federation. In November 1996

Uzbekistan rejected selection of Russian Army General Mikhail Kolesnikov to be CIS Chief of Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation, stating that this “interstate body should be headed by a representative of a state other than Russia, a citizen of which has already held this post.”¹⁶⁶ Uzbekistan pushed for a negotiated settlement in Tajikistan and bypassed Moscow to begin diplomatic initiatives of its own.

This cooling did not go unnoticed. The Russian nationalist journal *Zavtra* complained of Tashkent’s “emphatically pro-West orientation in the economy, the harsh invective apropos integration treaties in the CIS, the decisive refusal to join even the Customs Union, and a methodical anti-Russian nationality policy. . . .”¹⁶⁷ Another observer commented, “The more heartfelt Moscow’s appeals for closer integration within the CIS became, the more often Tashkent displayed indifference, or at best, a cool interest with many reservations.”¹⁶⁸

Nevertheless, in speeches Karimov still supports participation in the CIS and identifies the “key issues” as the “development and strengthening of equal ties with sovereign Russia and a reliance on its potential.”¹⁶⁹ Uzbekistan knows that it is not a vital interest of the United States, but it is a vital interest of Russia. Therefore, Uzbekistan can remain under the CIS’s collective security umbrella and still play an increasingly independent role and evade being drawn into Moscow’s sphere.

At the same time Uzbekistan has developed increasingly warmer ties with the United States. Originally the United States was critical of Tashkent’s poor human rights record and linked financial assistance to Uzbekistan’s progress in forging democratic institutions.¹⁷⁰ But as Uzbekistan grew in regional importance, the mood in Washington shifted to fear that the United States would lose influence if it kept pushing human rights. Following the visit of Defense Secretary William Perry in April 1995, a sharp shift in American policy occurred. Uzbekistan allowed a Radio

Liberty office to open in Tashkent. Uzbekistan joined Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Uzbek contingents participated in PfP exercises (COOPERATIVE NUGGET in August 1995 and COOPERATIVE OSPREY in August 1996) in the United States; in September 1996, U.S. forces traveled to Uzbekistan for Exercise BALANCE ULTRA-96.¹⁷¹ American and Uzbek forces have conducted multinational exercises together including the airborne jump into Chimkent in 1997. Uzbek officers regularly attend courses at the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and in the United States.

President Karimov's visit to the United States in the summer of 1996 cemented economic investment and military cooperation. He signed six contracts worth \$200 million, and the United States granted credit of \$400 million for the development of an Uzbek oil and gas complex.¹⁷² A defense conversion program begun in 1995 is studying (among other projects) conversion of the Chkalov aviation plant. A joint U.S.-Uzbek committee for the conversion of Uzbek defense enterprises has been established, and the U.S. Government-sponsored Overseas Private Investment Corporation has budgeted \$500 million to support joint ventures.¹⁷³

At the same time, Tashkent has supported economic, political, and military integration *within* Central Asia. Uzbekistan ratified bilateral military agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In 1996, Tashkent signed a border-protection agreement with Ashgabat.¹⁷⁴ In January 1997, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan signed a tripartite treaty declaring "eternal friendship" and promising to cooperate militarily within a mutual defense agreement (outside the Tashkent Accord).¹⁷⁵ The presidents of the three states meet regularly at sessions of the Interstate Council of the Tripartite Central Asian Union to discuss political problems and economic integration; they coordinate joint positions before upcoming CIS summits in Moscow.

As a result, Washington policymakers began to argue that the United States needs Uzbekistan as an “island of stability” between Russia’s regional ambitions from the north and Islamic fundamentalism from the south.¹⁷⁶ In that sense, Uzbekistan is the “anchor store” for the Central Asian mall, acting as a strong stabilizer to prevent a Central Asian political vacuum and a core military force around which to develop units such as the CENTRAZBAT. An anchor store, however, is designed to draw in customers that are then shared by smaller shops in the mall; if it becomes too overwhelming and monopolizes business, smaller stores may seek leases elsewhere. A similar balancing act must occur in Central Asia. A strong Uzbekistan stabilizes the region; a too strong Uzbekistan threatens its neighbors and drives them into the arms of Russia.

WHAT ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE?

The U.S. armed forces were early players in Central Asia. Military flights carried humanitarian aid and visiting dignitaries. Moscow’s attaches, experienced travelers to the region, could easily be dual-accredited. With the downsizing in Europe following the end of the Cold War, the Central Asian states were an obvious target for stockpiled military supplies such as field hospitals and food stocks. The military was a tool immediately at hand that Washington could use to show the flag; its personnel were trained in military assistance and it had the means readily available to project into the region.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to have a role in Central Asia, but it must be careful that it is not counterproductive. The DoD can have the greatest impact on the development of Central Asian armed forces through military education, military-to-military contact, arms control and treaty verification, cooperative threat reduction, and defense conversion.

Currently, military education for Central Asian armed forces is channeled through International Military Education and Training (IMET) Programs which have exploded over the last 4 years, except in Tajikistan where none are allotted.¹⁷⁷ Under the new “expanded” IMET concept, Congress mandated that funds be allocated to the services to develop courses on defense resource management, military justice, civil-military relations, and internationally-recognized human rights. Central Asian officers attend these courses. Courses also exist to prepare them for attendance at various Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, and senior service colleges.¹⁷⁸

Military-to-military contact programs for the five Central Asian states have been ministered by the European Command (EUCOM) J-5, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.¹⁷⁹ EUCOM has used congressionally-mandated “CINC Initiative Funds” to pay for its military-to-military programs and PfP activities. EUCOM also administers the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, which presents two 5-month courses a year to teach senior military officers and civilian officials about defense planning, organization, and management in democratic societies with market economies.¹⁸⁰

The DoD also plays a major roll in arms control and treaty verification. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)¹⁸¹ engages in a number of inspection and escort duties that help stabilize Central Asia and reduce the burden on developing militaries.¹⁸²

OSIA is active in non-nuclear inspections as well. All five Central Asian states are signatories of the Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) which set limits on the numbers of military exercises permitted and establishes methods for cooperation on unusual military activities, compliance and verification evaluations and

inspections, and an exchange of annual military activities calendars, as well as information on military budgets, defense establishments and military forces; OSIA provides personnel for OSCE inspections and evaluations. Kyrgyzstan is a signatory to the Open Skies Treaty (March 24, 1992) which allows reciprocal, unarmed observation overflights for which OSIA has responsibility. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were original signatories in 1993 of the Chemical Weapons Agreement; inspections will be conducted with OSIA escorts. OSIA was also given the audit and examination mission for Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in May 1994; its inspectors conduct audits and examinations to certify that CTR-related equipment is being used for its intended purpose.

The initial Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, co-sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, was broadened into the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) after the breakup of the Soviet Union to provide material assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine with the goals of denuclearization, demilitarization, and reducing the threat of weapons proliferation.¹⁸³ Recently CTRP has expanded beyond its original mission; CTRP funds are financing a U.S.-Kazakhstani joint venture to convert the Semipalatinsk test site and provide foreign exports from electronic devices and circuit boards.¹⁸⁴

The DoD has also provided funds to convert Central Asian defense industries for civilian use. Aside from the Semipalatinsk project already mentioned, under William Perry the DoD gave Kazakhstan four grants worth \$37 million; one such project involved reequipping the Stepnogorsk chemical plant for the output of civilian chemical products.¹⁸⁵

The programs are coordinated and executed by American Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) in the region. Defense Attaches have operated in the region since the formation of the republics. Initially personnel from the

embassy in Moscow visited periodically, then beginning in January 1993 they were augmented by Foreign Area Officers on short-term temporary duty serving as interim attaches. The first permanent attache office opened in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 1994.¹⁸⁶ The last Central Asian office, in Ashgabat, is slated to formally open in 1998.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: REGIONAL REACTION

Beyond the immediate impact of American aid to the armed forces of these republics, the United States must take caution that its military operations in Central Asia do not alienate or threaten other regional powers. A negative reaction by China, Iran, or Russia could have a much greater impact upon regional stability than the military development of these new states.

China.

Proficient armed forces which support political stability, repress politicized Islam, and safeguard markets would be welcomed by China. China is developing trade, transportation, and energy links with Central Asia, including a planned pipeline, and is making serious inroads into their consumer market.¹⁸⁷ Thus, in one sense, China should support American programs to strengthen Central Asian armed forces. Strong militaries enhance domestic stability which is in China's interest, and they likely will not be perceived by China as a threat.

Beijing's greatest internal security challenge is in its predominantly Muslim Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous Region—comprising one-sixth of China's territory—which borders Central Asia. Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang share an ethnic Kazakh/Kyrgyz-Uigher heritage. Almaty/Bishkek and Beijing share a fear of militant Islam. Therefore, China appreciates Bishkek's and Almaty's restraint from allowing their states to become a cross-border safe haven or breeding ground for the militants

responsible for several recent acts of terrorism in Xinjiang. Improved security forces and border forces play an important role in that prohibition.

On the surface, therefore, American support to developing Central Asian militaries would be seen as a positive force in the region. But, on the other hand, such programs could harken back to earlier security groupings by which Washington sought to “contain” China along its periphery. With the breakup of the USSR, weak Central Asian indigenous forces and a strategic buffer zone replaced the forward basing of the Soviet Army and border guard forces antagonistic to China’s interests. America’s motives in creating defense ties with the Central Asian states could be misinterpreted, especially if overall Sino-American relations deteriorate.

Iran.

Teheran has vital interests in maintaining regional peace and stability, but its international isolation and pariah status prevent direct action in support of its genuine security concerns. Iran shares its ethnicity and Shi’ite faith with Tajikistan (the other Central Asian states are ethnically Turkic and Sunni), but Iran still shares historic ties and economic interests. Iran has refrained from spreading politicized Islam and from sponsoring overt missionary efforts; Teheran has worked instead to focus on developing trade ties with the region. Iran wants to exploit its geographical location as a transportation route and land corridor to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; for example, it constructed a rail link from Turkmenistan that allows Central Asia to bypass Russian rail routes. Ashgabat also will open the first Turkmen pipeline south into Iran (Korpedzhe-Kurtkoy) later this year. A joint commission on economic cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran meets to deal with cooperation in the oil and gas sector, power engineering, agriculture, transportation, communications, trade, and banking contacts.¹⁸⁸ Increased trade and

investment within Central Asia (especially Turkmenistan) offer Teheran an opportunity to reconstruct its own war-ravaged and constricted economy, increase foreign trade, and play a leadership role within the Islamic trade organization, ECO, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The strengthening of Central Asian militaries will promote regional political stability, which will enhance Iran's long-term economic goals for the region. But, America's motives are also suspect in Teheran. Teheran may assume that efforts by Washington to strengthen Central Asian militaries are targeted at Iran. A regional grouping built around Uzbekistan might provide a military counterweight to Iran. Central Asian participation in PfP also increases the role of Iran's rival and western neighbor, Turkey, which is the "point-man" for the program; Turkey and Iran are traditional political and economic rivals for influence in the region.¹⁸⁹ If Iran feels threatened by these actions, it may drive it even closer to Russia.

Russia.

Moscow also views with suspicion any efforts to usurp its position as hegemon in Central Asia. The inability of most Central Asian states to develop viable armed forces provided the context for Russia's reassertion of its interests in the region. Moscow's stated goal to boost integration envisions *Russia* as the godfather of Central Asian militaries—not the United States.

Leadership in the CIS, however, is both a blessing and a burden. Peacekeeping in Tajikistan overstretched scarce resources, but Russia's self-image as a "great power" demanded that it manage the violence. Russia's "strategic denial" precludes involvement by neighbors who wish to extend their own influence, but Russia's continuing economic dislocation makes it very difficult to maintain facilities and implement agreements. The fear by some Russians that Washington is waiting in the wings to usurp

Moscow's role in Central Asia overstates America's desire or ability to assume responsibility for Central Asian security, but it still acts as a potential irritant in the framework of U.S.-Russian political affairs. This is especially true as Russia watches NATO enlargement with resentment and distrust. Increased American military involvement in Central Asia seems to bracket Russia between a concerted U.S. effort to increase its authority in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Central Asia—all at Moscow's expense.

The great problem of such an analysis is that it could result in Moscow searching for new allies to defend itself against such a perceived danger. Several observers in Central Asia have expressed fear that NATO enlargement will prod Russia to continue efforts to improve its ties with China and Iran. Many have voiced the fear that Moscow might create a new tripartite alliance bloc among the three states in the 21st century, and that Central Asia would find itself sandwiched in the middle.¹⁹⁰ This is not an ungrounded fear. Russian journalist Vsevolod Ovchinnikov argues that shortsighted actions on Washington's part are prompting Moscow and Beijing to shift their emphasis from bilateral to geopolitical aspects of cooperation.

Moscow is concerned about efforts to extend NATO's infrastructure to Russia's present borders. Beijing is alarmed by attempts to lend an anti-Chinese thrust to the American-Japanese security system and other bilateral military ties from the cold war era.¹⁹¹

A new geopolitical landscape is taking shape, he argues, one in which Russia and China are becoming the other's strategic rear and renewing their alliance of the 1950s.¹⁹²

America's Response.

The United States must be extremely careful to what degree and at what pace it assists the development of Central Asian militaries, or the "law of unexpected

consequences” may ricochet with a vengeance. The United States should focus on quality of life issues, training, education, senior executive development, defense conversion, and arms control. For example, one reform which could revolutionize these forces is the development of a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. Stricter control in the barracks would alleviate bullying and ethnic tension; stricter control in the field would improve operational readiness. Senior executive development through attendance at schools such as the Marshall Center supports civilian control of defense infrastructure and trains senior leaders to work under legislative oversight. Washington should push qualitative institutional reforms such as defense transparency and accountable defense budgets.

The United States should not actively seek to sell arms to Central Asian militaries to replace Soviet equipment and bring about standardization with NATO. Nor should Washington support the efforts by these nations to gain export currency by becoming arms exporters themselves. Retaining Soviet equipment ensures abundant spare parts and interoperability. Central Asian economies cannot afford a wasteful arms race to buy the newest and most expensive military gadgets on the world arms market.

The United States must sponsor both bilateral and multilateral programs. Bilateral pairings, for example, between various states’ National Guards and individual Central Asian republics focus military-to-military contact. Inclusive multinational programs such as recent field exercises involving Russia, Central Asian, and NATO nations (e.g., Turkey) are a valuable tool; they are nonthreatening to other regional powers (especially if they are included) and promote regional cooperation.

CONCLUSION

When the republics of Central Asia became independent, they already had in place an administrative infrastructure

from the Soviet era; even if that political structure was a sham, it did make transition easier. The same cannot be said for the economic and military infrastructures in which all decisions were disseminated from the center. Industries and military units were spread across the Central Asian landscape based on a master plan in Moscow that did not involve promoting republican self-sufficiency in military affairs.

It is not surprising, therefore, that most Central Asian states initially preferred some form of unified command in which their deficiencies would be compensated by the greater whole and their external defense could become someone else's burden. All were perfectly willing to allow Russia, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to retain the bulk of the responsibility. Chechnya was a shock and a wake-up call for Central Asia as well as Russia. Thus, external events forced each state to create independent armed forces even as they began to discern weaknesses in the Russian Army and question its ability to realize all of its promises. Although the Central Asian states originally were willing to let Russia assert some authority within the region and provide trained forces for border duty, each began to seek alternative sources for their national security.

It was readily apparent that in most cases their own militaries could not foot the bill. Lacking trained cadres, training facilities, equipment, spare parts, an industrial base, and financial resources to support it all, development of Central Asian militaries has been slow—with an eye on retaining what each inherited from the Soviet Army rather than creating anything new. Finally, leaders prefer to apportion scarce resources to address competing social, economic, and environmental crises that threaten the very fabric of society over the development and funding of armed forces in the absence of an overt threat.

America has national interests in Central Asia, but it will not assume responsibility for Central Asia's security. The United States does not oppose the voluntary formation

of collective security agreements that maintain stability in the region, but prefers that the Central Asian states develop military institutions that allow them options other than reliance upon Moscow in their security policy formation. The primary focus of the United States will be damage control—to prevent existing problems from escalating into crises that might engage Russia, China, or Iran. The United States does not want Central Asia to become a breeding ground for politicized Islam, ethnic hatred, arms proliferation, drug production, political extremism, or any other transnational threat that would destabilize the region.¹⁹³

The United States should continue to support the development of Central Asian militaries through military education, military-to-military contact, arms control and treaty compliance, cooperative threat reduction, and defense conversion. But, we must work to ensure that our efforts do not provoke a negative reaction from regional neighbors and destabilize the balance of interests currently at play.

There is a wide variance among the Central Asian states regarding ability to assure their own national security. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are *consumers*, rather than *providers*, of security. Kyrgyzstan has attempted to transition to a provider of security through its economic, political, and military cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Regardless of their methodology, however, each retains military ties with Russia. There is nothing inherently wrong with the Central Asian states using the CIS as a collective security tool. There is nothing inherently wrong with Russia taking a role in this process. But, we must ensure that collective security is just that—collective. “Breaking away from the Bear” could actually strengthen security in Central Asia if the militaries of the Central Asian states develop to a level that they are players in the game and not just pawns of Moscow.

ENDNOTES

1. "A Caspian Gamble," *The Economist*, February 7, 1998, p. 3.
2. R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S., Russian Paratroops Join in Central Asian Jump," *The Washington Post*, September 15, 1997, p. A17.
3. See, for example, Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 162-177; Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century," *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 431-451; Kent Hughes Butts, ed., *Environmental Security: A DOD Partnership for Peace*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995; and Gareth Porter, "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 592, May 1995, pp. 218-222.
4. "Russia, Allies at Odds as Summit Opens," *The Washington Post*, April 29, 1998, p. A23.
5. The attempt to create a purely Slavic union in Minsk on December 8, 1991, was short-lived; within 2 weeks the five newly-independent Central Asian republics, plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, agreed to join the CIS "on an equal basis."
6. Ronald Bonesteel, "The CIS Security System: Stagnating, In Transition or on the Way Out?," unpublished manuscript, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), August 1992, pp. 1-7, discusses the Lobov-Shaposhnikov debate prior to the founding of the CIS armed forces.
7. The idea was put forth by Soviet Chief of the General Staff General Vladimir Lobov.
8. The CINC of the Combined Strategic Armed Forces, under this plan, commanded Strategic Deterrent Forces (Strategic Rocket Forces, Aviation Strategic Nuclear Forces, Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces, and aerospace units) and Strategic Mobile Defense Forces (Air Forces, Navy, Ground Defense Troops, and Airborne Troops). A CIS Coordinating Council (Defense Council) subordinate to the Council of the Heads of States would oversee issues of defense expenditures, nuclear planning and safety, social protection of servicemen, standardization, and arms control.

9. At the top were the CIS presidents and a CIS Defense Council (with a Committee on Questions of Collective Security), which “oversaw” the Supreme High Commander of the CIS Armed Forces (Shaposhnikov, appointed commander for two months on December 30). Subordinate to the High Command (and its Main Staff) were the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), CIS Combined Strategic Forces (Air Forces, Navy, Ground Defense Troops and Airborne Troops) and the CinC, CIS Combined Armed Forces, to which the armed forces on the territories of states entering into the CIS were subordinate. Republican defense ministers formed a council which was a “coordinating organ.”

10. Bonesteel, “The CIS Security System,” p. 2. Shaposhnikov noted, “The defense ministers of the sovereign republics are setting up a council to meet . . . to solve military problems, the financing of the armed forces and their strength and manning, for instance. *But this does not necessarily mean that the defense ministers of republics will control the national armed forces. The Soviet defense minister will do this through his general staff.*” *Ibid.* [italics-editor]

11. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan supported the unified command structure, but they were in the minority. Kobets’ proposal (which permitted each republic to have its own independent armed forces) was approved by the ministers, but they bypassed hard decisions on personnel, budgets, weapons procurement, oaths of allegiance, logistics, etc., in favor of setting up a series of interstate commissions to coordinate matters. William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus*, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995, p. 17.

12. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, January 18, 1992, in *Joint Publications Research Service - Military Affairs* (hereafter *JPRS-UMA*)-92-004, February 6, 1992, p. 21.

13. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, January 18, 1992, in *JPRS-UMA*-92-004, February 6, 1992, pp. 12-13. A decision on the Caspian Sea flotilla was not reached until May 1992, when it was divided up among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. “Caspian Flotilla: A Decision To Divide It Has Been Reached,” *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, (henceforth *CDPP*), Vol. XLIV, No. 16, May 20, 1992, p. 26. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as a result created coastal naval forces, predominantly engaged in anti-smuggling and anti-drug operations.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

15. John W. R. Lepingwell, "New States and Old Soldiers: Civil-Military Relations in the Former Soviet Union," in John W. Blaney, ed., *The Successor States to the USSR*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995, pp. 73-74.

16. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, June 16, 1993, in *JPRS-UMA-93-024*, July 14, 1993, p. 1. Shaposhnikov resigned the position of secretary in August of that year and was named secretary of the Russian Security Council. Stephen Foye, "End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (hereafter *RFE/RL RR*), Vol. 2, No. 27, July 2, 1993, p. 45, regarded this as "a belated but final admission by the Russian political and military leaderships that their efforts to use the CIS as a means of maintaining a common security system on the territory of the former USSR had ended in failure." Colonel General Valery Mironov, Deputy Russian Minister of Defense, sharply critiqued these early attempts at establishing joint command. The series of agreements in the military sphere, concluded at the initial stage of the formation of the CIS, on the creation of the CIS Joint Armed Forces (JAF), lacked a precise mechanism of realization of their provisions. Because of this, the military cooperation of the new states, although it did have some legal base, could not in that period of time have been exercised in full. But this joint military structure ultimately proved nonviable and was subsequently eliminated. Moscow, *Segodnya*, in Russian, July 20, 1995, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Military Affairs* (hereafter *FBIS-UMA*)-95-153-S, August 9, 1995, p. 19.

17. Almaty, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, in Russian, February 21, 1995, *JPRS-UMA-05-012*, March 21, 1995, p. 32. The views are of Telugan Zhukeyev, secretary of the Kazakhstani Security Council. He continued, ". . . collective efforts are preferable, since it is easier to achieve parity and equality in mutual relations on the basis of multilateral, rather than bilateral, relations (the principle of consensus). Only a collective approach, which presupposes the equalization of conditions and the possibility of making compromise decisions, is capable of strengthening our positions. Whereby no one dominates, no one imposes his will, and even a large state reckons with the wishes of its allies."

18. As Odom and Dujarric note, all 11 states signed only the Protocol on Military Issues (which merely instructed defense ministers to prepare a new block of agreements for the next summit). The Strategic Forces Agreement was signed by all but Moldova; the General Purpose Forces Agreement was signed by eight members, but not Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan; the appointment of Marshal Shaposhnikov as CINC was signed by all but Moldova and Turkmenistan; an Agreement

on Supplying the Armed Forces was signed by seven states, but not Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia; an Agreement on Safeguards of Servicemen was signed by all but Moldova; and the decision to establish a Defense Ministers Council was signed by only Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Ukraine agreed to a single budget for strategic forces, but would not pay into that budget for unified general purpose forces as it was already establishing its own republican force. Odom and Dujarric, p. 21.

19. The 11 states attending were: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

20. Kyrgyzstan did not immediately sign simply because President Askar Akayev was not present. Kyrgyzstan later signed the document. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus joined in 1993. Ukraine objected to the implication that its external borders would be protected by CIS (Russian) forces on its territory. Turkmenistan later backed off membership, preferring bilateral treaties with Russia and a policy of "positive neutrality." Some argued that the treaty marked a shift of Russian policy away from the Slavic orientation of the original CIS signatories, but that overstates the case. The treaty did not go into effect until April 20, 1994.

21. Moscow, *New Times International*, in English, No. 37, September 1993, in *JPRS-UMA-93-037*, October 6, 1993, pp. 1-3.

22. Moscow, *Izvestiya*, February 24, 1992, in *FBIS-SOV-92-036*, February 24, 1992, p. 35.

23. Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, supported a unified force until Russia changed its position. As President Nazarbayev noted,

We are not renouncing the signed documents on creating Joint Armed Forces with a unified command. At present we remain loyal to this principle. But Russia, which has always said that it would be one of the very last to start creating its own army, has begun to work out a military doctrine and is starting to create an army.

President Karimov of Uzbekistan concurred. "I agree with what Nursultan Nazarbayev said about our not being able to get along without a so-called mutual security treaty, and we would like the states that today are part of the CIS . . . , especially Russia, to sign such treaty." *CDPP*, Vol. XLIV, No. 17, May 27, 1992, p. 20.

24. This does not mean that the CIS security structure has been dismantled; indeed, it is constantly expanding: the Council of Defense Ministers (February 1992), the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation (December 1993), the Coordinating Committee for Air Defense Issues (February 1995), the Military Technical Committee (April 1995), and the Committee of the Chief of Staff (March 1996) all meet regularly.

25. Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *Central Asia and the World*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 177.

26. This is the opinion of Yuri Shishkov, a Russian analyst at the government run political research institute, IMEMO. *The Washington Post*, April 29, 1998, p. A24. Even the air defense network is in danger due to funding problems. The integrated CIS network, comprised of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, founded in 1996, is broke. Only Russia and Belarus have actually allocated funds for its development, and even Russia, which originally promised 100 billion rubles, has only anted up 10 billion rubles. *CDPP*, Vol. 50, No. 15, May 13, 1998, pp. 18-19.

27. This phenomenon is described by Uri Ra'anani, "The Nation-State Fallacy," in Joseph Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peace-making in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 5-20.

28. Pavel Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles*, London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 12.

29. Thus, Moscow decreed that Uzbekistan's agriculture be turned into a cotton monoculture—overfertilized and fed by waters diverted from the Aral Sea—for the greater good of the Soviet Union, at the expense of other agricultural enterprises, such as food stuffs, which would have benefitted Uzbekistan itself. In August 1991, only 8 percent of Kazakhstan's industrial sector was under republican control, with the rest administered through Moscow (as part of all-USSR ministries or joint USSR-republican control). Kazakhstan has enormous reserves of oil, but under Soviet rule it had no refining facilities of its own and it could only ship oil to Russia. Therefore, that same year Kazakhstan shipped to Russia the equivalent of \$2.7 billion worth of petroleum, but had to purchase from Russia the equivalent of \$1.2 billion worth of processed fuel and lubricants. Martha Brill Olcott, "National Building and Ethnicity in the Foreign Policies of the New Central Asian States," in Roman Szporluk, ed., *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and*

the New States of Eurasia, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994, p. 213. The Unified Power System, a network of power stations (centrally planned and allocated) provided electricity to the entire empire; today cash, not central planning, decides who gets electricity. One common currency, the rouble, was standard; the rouble zone “broke up” in 1993, forcing each republic to develop its own currency.

30. While Western analysts referred to this region as “Soviet Central Asia” and now call it “Central Asia,” when Soviet and Russian analysts talk of “Central Asia,” they exclude Kazakhstan.

31. The Central Asian Military District was disbanded August 11, 1992. The Turkestan Military District’s offices were occupied by the Uzbek Ministry of Defense on February 20, 1992; it was formally abolished on June 30th of that year.

32. Estimated deployment of military equipment and personnel at the time of independence within Central Asia includes:

Tanks	4,000
ACVs	10,000
Artillery	3,200
Helicopters	170
Aircraft	220
Personnel	150,000

Richard Starr, *The New Military in Russia; Ten Myths That Shape the Image*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996, p. 54.

33. See, for example, Alexander Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces Historical Experience, Current Practices, and Implications for the Future—An Executive Summary*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983; *Idem*, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1980; *Idem*, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army—Asset or Liability?*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988; Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military*, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985; Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, *Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1982; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalities and the Soviet Military,” in Lybomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 72-94; *Idem*, “Brotherhood in Arms’: The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces,” in Nandor F. Dreisziger, ed., *Ethnic Armies Polyethnic Armed Forces From the Time of the Hapsburgs To the Age of the Superpowers*, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990, pp. 123-157; Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet*

Military Management at the Troop Level, New York: Crane, Russak, 1975; Richard Gabriel, *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980; and Robert Bathurst and Michael Burger, *Controlling the Soviet Soldier: Some Eyewitness Accounts*, College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1981.

34. Jones, p. 45.

35. Proponents claimed that troops in construction battalions had less strenuous duty, discipline was more lax, and they usually received an additional wage from the civilian project they were building far above the token five roubles a month military pay. Central Asians took a dimmer view. After independence, Turkmenistan stated that they would no longer provide men for construction battalions because these units were "clearly abnormal." A Turkmen delegation to Moscow reported that essentially, "people have been left to their own devices, commanders had practically no control over them, and the arbitrary rule of barracks hooligans reigns in subunits." Sick soldiers were left untreated. Ashkhabad, *Frunzevets*, in Russian, April 16, 1992, pp. 1,3, in *JPRS-UMA-92-021*, June 10, 1992, p. 36. Such segregation was not all due to ethnic prejudice; inability of many Central Asian recruits to speak Russian and thus understand verbal orders rendered them ineffective in combat.

36. National Guard recruits were to be competitively selected to serve 17 month terms. One of their initial tasks was to disarm the illegal paramilitary formations emerging on the wake of the Tajik civil war. Richard Woff, *The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union Evolution, Structure, and Personalities*, Portsmouth, Great Britain: Carmichael and Sweet Limited, 1995 (henceforth Woff, 1995), p. D4-2. They failed. That same month Dushanbe announced formation of a National Defense Affairs Committee to oversee nationalization of Soviet units deployed in Tajikistan and to create indigenous units. In January 1992 the President (and Commander-in-Chief) gave the newly-appointed committee head control of the National Guard and appointed him State Security Advisor to the President.

37. *Ibid.*, p. D4-5. The 201st MRD, formerly part of the 40th Army transferred to Tajikistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, was headquartered in Dushanbe with two regiments located in Kurgan Tyube and Kulyab. Richard Starr estimates that about 90 percent of the 201st MRD is comprised of ethnic Tajik in the enlisted ranks. Starr, p. 145.

38. Starr, p. 145.

39. Moscow, *Novaya Yezhednevnyaya Gazeta*, in Russian, June 11, 1993, p. 5, in *JPRS-UMA-93-031*, August 25, 1993, p. 3. In June 1992 Tajikistan announced a conscription system for men aged 18 to 27 to serve from 18 to 20 months. Philip Petersen, "Security Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia," *European Security*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 204. Those with higher education but without special military training would serve 18 months, and those with no special military training and no higher education would serve 20 months.

40. During the Soviet period, "subsidies from the center used to make up at least 50 percent [of the budget], and in some years they were as high as 80 percent." Without that support, combined with civil war and the exodus of nearly 500,000 skilled Russians, the Tajik economy went into a freefall following independence from which it has yet to recover. "Tajikistan: How Dire the Situation?," *CDPP*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 33, September 11, 1996, p. 13.

41. Tajikistan is the lone non-Turkic Central Asian state. Ethnically Persian and Shi'ite by faith, it shares religious and ethnic ties with Iran and political and ethnic ties with Afghanistan. Indeed, more Tajiks reside in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan. See Bruce Pannier, "Drug Traffic on the Rise in Central Asia," *Transitions*, Vol. 2, No. 19, September 20, 1996, pp. 12-14.

42. Russian assistance helped to create a Tajik Defense Ministry, special purpose troops, internal troops, and a helicopter squadron by early 1994. Shishlyannikov hoped to create a "small, highly mobile, professional and dedicated army," but without a viable conscript system he had to rely upon troops of the so-called Popular Front of Tajikistan—paramilitary, pro-communist forces raised during the civil war. It was a poor foundation upon which to build. Paul Beaver, ed., "Tajikistan," in *Jane's Sentinel Regional Security Assessment, Commonwealth of Independent States*, London: Jane's Information Group, 1994, p. 10.

43. *The Military Balance, 1997/98*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 162.

44. One other external source in the region belongs to the U.N. On December 16, 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 968 which established an observer mission (UNMOT) to monitor the April 1995 ceasefire; since then the U.N. has periodically renewed UNMOT as it monitored subsequent ceasefires. Currently 20 observers from seven countries belong to UNMOT. *The Military Balance 1997/98*, p. 162.

45. Pannier, "Drug Traffic," p. 12.

46. Richard Woff, *The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union Evolution, Structure, and Personalities*, Second Ed., London: Brassey's, 1996 (henceforth Woff, 1996), p. D4-8.

47. The commander of Tajik border forces earns the equivalent salary of a private in the Russian border troops. Tajik border cadets are trained in Russian border troops institutes and the St. Petersburg Artillery School. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, August 4, 1994, p. 2, in *JPRS-UMA-94-035*, August 24, 1994, pp. 59-60.

48. Woff, 1996, p. D4-10.

49. Baev, p. 112.

50. Woff, 1995, pp. D4-D8-D9. With a strength of 25,000 men, the force comprised the 201st MRD, an Operations Group from the Russian Border Troops under Russian command, and contingents of ground forces, border guards and internal troops from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Russia provided technical infrastructure, to include air defense, aviation, logistics, engineer, communications, space satellite, and ELINT (electronic intelligence) support elements.

51. *The Military Balance 1997/98*, p. 145. The accord was brokered by Russia, the U.N., and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

52. Tajikistan joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to form the "Central Asian Four" and held a successful meeting in March 1998 when the planned CIS meeting fell through. The Russian press (*Izvestiya*) noted, "No one is going to wait for anyone else. No matter what considerations Moscow is guided by, the time when others had to pin their hopes on the Kremlin star is past. . . . So where does this leave Russia? Should it perhaps join this Central Asian Union, since nothing has come of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan or the union of Russia and Bealrus except huge amounts of ink that have been used up in recent years, even as CIS summits keep being postponed." "Central Asia Won't Wait for Russia," *CDPP*, Vol. 50, No. 13, April 29, 1998, p. 17.

53. *CDPP*, Vol. 50, No. 2, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

54. Eugene Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *New*

States New Politics Building the Post-Soviet Nations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 678.

55. Bishkek did establish a State Defense Committee in late 1991; in January 1992 a State Committee for Defense Affairs was formed to advise President Akayev, which included a "Main Staff."

56. Petersen, p. 173. This telegram was also apparently sent to the Kazakhs because the commander of the 40th Army, who was a First Deputy Defense Minister of Kazakhstan, sent a telegram to Bishkek telling the republic to take control of the forces on its territory because the 40th Army would no longer be paying for them. *Ibid.*

57. "Border Pact Signed by Asia Powers," *The Washington Post*, April 25, 1997, p. A31. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and China signed an agreement on April 25, 1997, to reduce military forces along their shared borders and create a 100-kilometer (62-mile) wide zone on each side of the border in which limits are placed on armaments and personnel: 3,900 tanks for Russia and the three Central Asian states (of which 3,810 would be Russian) and 3,900 for China. Although Russian officials deny that withdrawal of border forces from the region is forthcoming, some reduction will probably be necessary. As part of the Shanghai Accord it also signed an agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field. This supplements China's growing role as a trading partner: between 1992 and 1995 imports expanded from \$16.6 million to \$123.5 million and exports from \$18.8 million to \$107.5 million. Gudrun Wacker, "China Builds Ties, Trade Across its Western Border," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 17, August 12, 1996, pp. 31-32.

58. See, for example, Gregory Gleason, "The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action," *RFE/RL Research Institute, Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 25, June 21, 1991, pp. 11-19.

59. Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, July 1997, Bishkek.

60. Beaver, "Kyrgyzstan," p. 14. The Russo-Kyrgyz Agreement of October 9, 1992, "On the Status of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation in the Kyrgyz Republic" defines the legal status of Russian forces in Kyrgyzstan. This was superseded by the Russo-Kyrgyz Agreement of July 15, 1994.

61. Bess Brown, "Central Asian States Seek Russian Help," *RFE/RL RR*, Vol 2, No. 25, June 18, 1993, p. 85. Four years later Russian troops still guard Kyrgyzstan's 1100 kilometer border with

China. The Russian Federation Group of Border Troops in Kyrgyzstan consists of three border detachments at Osh, Naryn, and Karko. Strugovets, p. 59. Aside from border forces, a small Russian presence is found. For example, an April 1993 treaty on military cooperation permits Russia to operate a communications center on Kyrgyz territory. *Ibid.*

62. The small (800-man) National Guard was formed in 1991 to support the constitutional order, protect the president, protect installations, and provide humanitarian relief.

63. *The Military Balance 1997/98* (p. 157) states that the division currently comprises three infantry, one armor, one artillery, and one AA regiment.

64. Petersen, p. 174.

65. Within a year he was replaced by an ethnic Russian; one of his first duties was to negotiate with Moscow over defense cooperation, joint use of Soviet military installations on Kyrgyz territory, and the status of Russian servicemen serving in Kyrgyzstan. He states, "only with the help of Russia can we hope to solve our military problems." Woff, 1995, p. D3-5.

66. Petersen, p. 174.

67. Woff, 1996, p. D3-13.

68. Petersen, p. 173.

69. Impoverished Kyrgyz recruits have lacked food and clothing; some even risked starvation. Bullying (*dedovshchina*) in the barracks continues. Is it any wonder that parents do not want their sons to join the armed forces, and draft dodging and desertion flourish? Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, July 1997, Bishkek.

70. It has adopted a military doctrine that, after touting standard phrases about defending territorial integrity and preserving the "constitution, sovereignty, and independence," prioritizes participation in a system of collective security in the interests of regional stability and peace and the assurance of free and equitable cooperation with other states. Woff, 1995, p. D3-7. In January 1994, the Kyrgyz Parliament adopted a national security concept that affirmed the defensive and 'non-nuclear' status of the armed forces, stating that those forces would never be used against another state in pursuance of political objectives or territorial aggrandizement that could not otherwise be achieved by

peaceful means. It confirmed that Kyrgyzstan did not consider any other state or coalition as an enemy. Beaver, "Kyrgyzstan," p. 9.

71. Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, July 1997, Bishkek.

72. The 535-man battalion—40 percent Kazakh, 40 percent Uzbek and 20 percent Kyrgyz—is stationed in southern Kazakhstan. Roger D. Kangas, "With an Eye on Russia, Central Asian Militaries Practice Cooperation," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 16, August 9, 1996, pp. 17-18.

73. Woff, 1996, p. D3-13.

74. *CDPP*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 52, January 22, 1997, p. 15.

75. *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 15, May 14, 1997, p. 21.

76. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS World Service*, in Russian, June 22, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-123*, June 25, 1996, p. 59.

77. Alma Ata, *Yegemendi Qazaqstan*, February 14, 1992, in *JPRS-UMA-92-018*, May 20, 1992, pp. 35-36.

78. For a discussion of Central Asian energy assets, see *Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Houston: The Center for International Political Economy and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, April 1998.

79. Things got so bad in August 1996, that Russia cut off the electricity supply to industrialized northern Kazakhstan for failure to pay its bill of \$420 million. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in Russian, August 15, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-160*, August 16, 1996, p. 46.

80. Author's interview with Kazakhstani defense officials, Almaty, July 1997.

81. *Ibid.*, p. D2-7. Nazarbayev's limited initial moves included a presidential decree even before independence to establish a State Committee of Defense of the Kazakhstani Soviet Socialist Republic responsible for disciplinary matters and maintaining the combat effectiveness of *Soviet* units deployed on Kazakhstani territory.

82. *Ibid.*, p. D2-6.

83. Woff, 1995, p. D2-10. Kazakhstani sovereignty was completed on August 25, 1992, when a military oath to the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted.

84. The Caspian Sea Flotilla was subdivided among Russia (50 percent), Azerbaijan (25 percent), Kazakhstan (12.5 percent) and Turkmenistan (12.5 percent). A Presidential Decree of April 2, 1993, formally established a Kazakhstani Navy under the Naval Department within the Main Armed Forces Staff. The Navy was officially inaugurated on August 17, 1996, at Aktau. Naval missions target smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration. The force itself more closely resembles a Coast Guard than a Navy. It currently possesses about a dozen ships, six Coast Guard cutters donated from the United States and several other ships built at a shipyard at Uralsk. "Anchors Aweigh," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 19, September 19, 1996, p. 44. In March 1995 it was agreed to create a Naval Border Patrol headquartered at Astrakhan comprising elements from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, formed from regular national naval units and remnants of the Caspian Flotilla. Richard Woff, "Kazakh-Russian relations-an update," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1995, p. 567. Kazakhstan is especially short of former-Soviet Naval staff officers and senior commanders.

85. *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, p. 156.

86. The National Guard has both Russian and ethnic Kazakh personnel, but approximately 68 percent of the officers are Kazakh, an unusual proportion. Lepingwell, p. 76.

87. Presidential Guard 2,000 and Government Guard 500. *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, p. 157.

88. Woff, 1995, p. D2-8. Internal Affairs is also responsible for combating organized crime and government corruption. By mid-1992 the third element of the security triad, the Committee on State Security (KGB), had become the Committee of National Security (KNB) of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The KNB retained close ties with new Russian intelligence agencies, as well as bilateral agreements with Ukraine and Belarus. The five Central Asian agencies formed a joint regional control structure for gathering and exchange of intelligence, in particular on terrorism, crime, and drug smuggling. *Ibid.*, p. D2-9.

89. Interview by author with Kazakhstani defense officials, July 1997, Almaty.

90. Woff, "Kazakh-Russian relations-an update," p. 568. The Eastern Border Troops District for the former-border Troops of the USSR KGB was abolished on August 18, 1992; it was replaced by the State Committee for Protection of the State Border and the National Border Troops Command. Border forces include six border subunits, two

air squadrons, and naval patrols on the Caspian Sea. Troops are trained at the Almaty Higher Border Troops Command School. There are approximately 12,000 Kazakhstani Border Guards. *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, p. 157.

91. This necessitated legal changes within the January 1993 law “On the State Borders of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (republished in August 1996) to redefine what constitutes a “state border” and to clarify the status and role of Kazakh and Russian border forces. Woff, 1996, p. D2-16.

92. Nazarbayev almost immediately stopped nuclear testing. Semipalatinsk was closed in 1991, and on May 15, 1992, parts of it were converted into the country’s national nuclear center and atomic energy agency. Nazarbayev also closed the uranium mines at Shalgi and Tasbulak and reduced the amount of uranium mined on the Caspian Sea island of Mangyshlak. In September 1992 Kazakhstan declassified and released data on its uranium reserves to the International Atomic Energy Agency. David Twining, *The New Eurasia*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, pp. 148-149. Kazakhstan has no known chemical or biological warfare programs. Almaty withdrew its 40-CIS Strategic Air Forces Tu-95 bombers to Russia in February 1994 and transferred the last warhead remaining on its soil to Russia on April 24, 1995. Beaver, “Kazakhstan,” p. 13. Second, Almaty divested itself of associated delivery structures. The United States guaranteed payment of at least \$70 million to help destroy the silos that housed Kazakhstan’s SS-18 missiles. By February 1993 U.S. aid pledged to dismantle and destroy these weapons had increased to \$85 million. Petersen, p. 161. Economic aid to Kazakhstan increased from \$91 million in 1993 to \$311 million in 1994. The agreements also covered 16 launch sites, two training silos, and 14 test silos. There is a difference between agreed upon Cooperative Threat Reduction funds and actual disbursements. For example, in 1996, the United States agreed upon \$87,560 and actually disbursed \$33,334. Monterey Institute of International Studies/The Carnegie Endowment for International Studies, *Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union Nuclear Weapons and Sensitive Export Status Report*, No. 4, May 1996, p. 54. In the December 1995 START Memorandum of Understanding, Kazakhstan declared it still had 24 silos (in Derzhavinsk) and 22 “intact but non-operational” ICBMs remaining in country. *Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union*, No. 4, May 1996, p. 10. Under START rules, ICBMs remain accountable until they are removed from their silos and their bases and silos remain accountable until they are destroyed. As a result of its policy of denuclearization, Almaty signed a series of international agreements. Kazakhstan ratified the Lisbon Protocol and START I in July. In 1994, Kazakhstan became a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) and signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This allowed for IAEA inspection of all Kazakhstani nuclear activities. IAEA inspectors are currently conducting an inventory of all nuclear materials in Kazakhstan. *Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union*, No. 4, May 1996, p. 5.

93. Kazakhstan promised nonintervention in the internal affairs of any other nation. Now denuclearized, it supports both non-proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons and an end to the arms race and its extension into space. The stated mission of the Kazakhstani armed forces is to *prevent* war; it rejects use of military force to resolve disputes unless it or its allies are attacked. Alma-Ata, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, in Russian, November 24, 1993, p. 3, in *JPRS-UMA-93-012*, April 7, 1993, pp. 51.

94. *Ibid.*

95. Since December 1991 more than 800 decisions have been issued on topics ranging from military cooperation to liquor sales, but no one knows how many have been signed by whom and ratified by which parliament. The 2,000-worker-strong CIS bureaucracy in Moscow is launching a study to find out. *The Washington Post*, April 29, 1998, p. A23.

96. *JPRS-UMA-92-018*, pp. 35-37.

97. *Ibid.* This shortage reflected not only Soviet manpower policy, but local cultural restraints against ethnic Kazakhs joining the military. "One does not hear the words 'become a commander, become an officer' from the mouths of parents in local areas. On the contrary, what they say is, 'If you become an officer, you will become too Russian and move away.'"

98. General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, Hero of the Soviet Union during World War II and a former division commander, attended the short course of the General Staff Academy.

99. Woff, "Kazakh-Russian Relations," p. 586.

100. Moscow, *Mayak Radio Network*, in Russian, July 1, 1993, in *FBIS-SOV-93-126*, p. 16. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, September 9, 1993, p. 2, in *JPRS-UMA-93-035*, September 22, 1993, pp. 33-34.

101. Andrei Kortunov, Yuri Kulchik, and Andrei Shoumikhin, "Military Structures in Kazakhstan: Aims, Parameters, and Some

Implications for Russia,” *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 14, No. 3, July-September 1995, p. 306.

102. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37. Only about 3 percent of the officers serving in the 40th Army in 1992 were Kazakh. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, July 2, 1992, p. 2, in *JPRS-UMA-92-026*, July 15, 1992, p. 38. Indeed, during the entire Soviet period, just three Kazakh officers had finished the General Staff Academy and only two had defended their dissertations in military science. Almaty, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, in Russian, November 24, 1993, p. 92, in *JPRS-UMA-93-012*, April 7, 1993, p. 53.

103. Dmitry Vertkin, “Prospects for Stability—The View from Kazakhstan,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1994, p. 287.

104. Woff, 1996, p. D2-24.

105. General Nurmagambetov downplayed the importance of languages in a September 1994 interview. “We conduct training in Russian. And we give commands in Russian. Ultimately, the language is not decisive. If a command is given in Kazakh and tomorrow combat readiness rises, I would order a switch to Kazakh today. This is not the issue.” Almaty, *Karavan*, in Russian, September 2, 1994, p. 6, in *JPRS-UMA-94-038*, September 14, 1994, p. 17.

106. Oumirserik Kasenov, “Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security,” *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April-June 1997, p. 34.

107. Douglas Clarke, “Russia’s Military Presence in the Near Abroad,” *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 19, October 26, 1995, pp. 8-9.

108. Agreements included *Declaration on the Expansion and Deepening of Russian-Kazakh Military Cooperation*; *Status of Russian Military Personnel Temporarily Stationed on Kazakh Territory*; *Contract Military Service and Status of Russian Citizens in the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan*; *Lease and Use of the Emba (Air Defense Missile) Test Range*; *Lease and Use of Priozersk*; *Use of the State Central Test Range of the Russian Defense Ministry*; and *Organization of Military Inter-state Transportation on Behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry*. Woff, “Kazakh-Russian relations—an update,” p. 568.

109. *Ibid.*

110. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, October 10, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-196*, October 11, 1995, p. 22.

111. Woff, 1996, pp. D2-21 - D2-22. According to Defense Ministers Grachev and Kasymov, the main result of the meeting was that, "they had worked out general approaches to the defence of national interests of the two countries, defined their common collective security aims, and laid firm foundations for further developing of bilateral military cooperation on principles of mutual understanding, parity, and mutual respect, and defined specific measures for their implementation." *Ibid.*, p. D2-22.

112. This was not necessarily a bad decision, for the "... dimensions of the Soviet legacy present a powerful argument to the effect that the maintenance or revival of traditional Soviet supply arrangements may, in a number of cases, represent a perfectly rational economic choice, at least in the short to medium term. " David Dyker, "International Economic Integration for Central Asia," *The Royal Institute of International Affairs FSS Briefing*, No. 11, January 1997, p. 1.

113. *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 44, December 3, 1997, p. 18. Moscow insisted that the debts it owed on lease payments for proving grounds and launch sites be offset against Kazakh enterprises' debts to Russian suppliers, but Almaty refused to be held liable for the debts of private structures.

114. Almaty, *Kazakh Television First Program Network*, in Russian, August 12, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-158*, August 14, 1996, p. 51. Russia supplied the "Kazakh Battalion" with weapons, ammunition, and foodstuffs. Kazakhstan paid the bills. Moscow, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in Russian, January 6, 1997, p. 6, in *FBIS-SOV-97-004*, January 6, 1997 (*INTERNET*).

115. Kasenov, pp. 30-31.

116. Almaty, *Delovaya Nedelya*, in Russian, September 6, 1996, p. 12, in *FBIS-SOV-96-117*, September 11, 1996, p. 47.

117. *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 28, August 13, 1997, p. 21.

118. In December 1994 the memorandum of Security Decrees was signed in Budapest; the United States and Great Britain confirmed their commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Kazakhstan and to avoid the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Kazakhstan. If Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or an object of the threat to use nuclear weapons, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain must demand immediate action by the U.N. Security

Council to render assistance to Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear NPT member state.

119. Kasenov, pp. 34-35.

120. *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, p. 162.

121. Interview by author with Turkmen defense officials, July 1997, Ashgabat.

122. *Ibid.*

123. Kangas, "With an Eye," p. 16.

124. *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, p. 162.

125. Of the rest, approximately 70 remained under Russian control and constituted an Air Defense Group and Air Force Group of the Russian Federation. A small number were disbanded or transferred back to Russian territory. Beaver, "Turkmenistan," p. 9; *The Military Balance, 1995/1996*, p. 152.

126. The Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, a Turkmen, was not appointed until September 1992.

127. Kasenov, p. 40.

128. They included the status of Russian officers serving on contract; training and education of Turkmen cadets and officers at Russian military schools and academies; finance and assistance; naval activity in the Caspian Sea; and cooperation between Russian and Turkmen intelligence services. Woff, 1995, p. D5-17.

129. Tajikistan also legalized dual citizenship in October 1995.

130. Woff, 1996, p. D5-17.

131. Ashgabat did provide its own training facility. A Border Guards Academy at Nebit-Dag graduated the first class of Turkmen border troops in September 1992.

132. This group is part of a larger joint Border Patrol Force in the Caspian, made up of forces from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and created by the CIS Border Guard Council in 1995. Previously the Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District had covered Turkmenistan's 600-mile border with Iran and the 450-mile border with Afghanistan. Now the border would also include the Caspian Sea. At the

CIS Kiev summit in March 1992 it was decided to create a CIS Border Troops Command; this was soon overcome by events as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan formed their own border forces. The CABTD was abolished on August 11, 1992. Ashgabat sends an observer to routine meetings of the Council of CIS Border Troops Commanders, but is still is not a formal member. Woff, 1996, pp. D5-15 - D5-16.

133. Starr, p. 145.

134. President Niyazov attended the Tashkent summit, but left without signing.

135. Niyazov explained his reasoning for adopting this policy during a 1995 conference address in Ashgabat. "Having today over 30 percent of the world reserves of natural gas, up to 12 billion tonnes of oil in the Caspian shelf alone, owning a huge territory and a population of almost 5 million, it is impossible to do without neutrality, it is impossible to join any group of countries for that would lead to the creation of blocs and weaken neutrality." Kasenov, p. 40.

136. Petersen, p. 188.

137. Moscow, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in Russian, February 17, 1996, p. 10 in *FBIS-SOV-96-035*, February 21, 1996, p. 52.

138. Beaver, "Turkmenistan, p. 10. In a similar vein, Turkmenistan joined PfP in May 1994, the first Central Asian state to do so. Bess Brown, "Turkmenistan Joins NATO Partnership," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 90, May 11, 1994, p. 2.

139. Kangas, "With an Eye," p. 19.

140. *CDPP*, Vol. 50, No. 3, February 18, 1998, p. 18.

141. Woff, 1995, p. D6-8. The Ministry's jurisdiction initially was limited to the Military Commissariat, Civil Defense Staff, and pre-military training. The Turkestan Military District was abolished on June 30, 1992. As a result of the Law on Defense and the disbanding and cessation of operations of the Turkestan Military District, on July 2, 1992 the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Uzbekistan replaced the Ministry for Defense Affairs. Tashkent, *Vatan Pavar*, in Russian, July 7, 1992, in *JPRS-UMA-92-033*, September 2, 1992, p. 30. The first Defense Minister was Lieutenant General Rustam Akhmedov. A native Uzbek, he served with armored troops and was a graduate of the Frunze Academy.

142. On paper the National Guard is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but in reality the brigade-size force has always been under the *de facto* control of the President. It guards important installations, conducts anti-terrorist operations, assists disaster relief, and provides a ceremonial guard.

143. Woff, 1995, p. D6-9. Once the Uzbek Defense Ministry was formed on July 2, a presidential decree placed former CIS formations and units (e.g. a fighter bomber regiment and an airborne brigade) under Uzbek jurisdiction "in accordance with Agreements of the CIS Heads of State" signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, and affirmed at the July 6 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers. *Ibid*, p. D6-10. Uzbekistan recalled its servicemen from non-CIS republics (e.g., Baltic states) not under contract, and declared that the remainder of its recruits would either serve with the Turkestan Military District's conventional forces, republican MVD troops, and National Guard units or perform alternative service. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in Russian, March 24, 1992, in *JPRS-UMA-92-011*, April 1, 1992, pp. 77-78. This provision was later dropped, and servicemen who continued serving abroad forfeited their citizenship.

144. "On Defense" outlined the role of the Armed Forces, procedures for declaring a 'state of war' and martial law, mobilization, and territorial defense. "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" discussed universal military obligations for all citizens, service in the reserve, manning, military ranks, uniform regulations, pre-military service training, reserve officer training, call-up procedures, service age-limits by rank, periods of service, mobilization and demobilization, and pay and allowances. "On Alternate Service" defined the religious and moral grounds or family circumstances by which a citizen could opt for alternate service for 18 months in *lieu* of military service; conscientious objection to war was not deemed sufficient grounds for alternative service.

145. Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, July 12, 1992, in *JPRS-UMA-92-031*, August 20, 1992, pp. 33-34.

146. *The Military Balance 1997/98*, p. 163.

147. Interview by author with Uzbek defense officials, July 1996, Tashkent.

148. Valentin Shishlevskiy, "Armed Forces of Uzbekistan," *Asian Defence Review*, No. 108/10/94, December 1994, p. 52.

149. In 1994 it was approximately \$325 million. It decreased in 1995 to \$315 million, then again in 1996 to \$304 million. *The Military Balance 1995/96*, p. 166. *The Military Balance 1996/1997*, p. 168. *The Military Balance 1997/98* estimated the budget at \$113 million. p. 163.

150. Tashkent, *Uzbekistan Television*, in Russian, May 17, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-098*, May 20, 1996, p. 66.

151. At independence Russian-speaking personnel comprised 70 percent of the officers corps of the Soviet forces in Uzbekistan.

152. For a Russian point of view, see Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 22, 1994, in *JPRS-UMA-94-046*, November 9, 1994, p. 22. While the situation matches many issues described in the Central Asian military press, notice the underlying attitude that these problems are intractable unless the ethnic Russians are coerced to remain to solve them.

153. Moscow, *INTERFAX*, in English, August 30, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-169*, August 31, 1995, pp. 68-69.

154. Tashkent, *Narodnoye Slovo*, in Russian, September 15, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-185*, September 25, 1995, pp. 87-92.

155. Roger D. Kangas, "Taking the Lead in Central Asian Security," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 9, May 3, 1996, pp. 53-54.

156. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90. The document outlined the principles for the construction and strategic use of armed forces; conditions for their use; preparation of the republic's economy; territory and population for defense; preparation of the economy for mobilization; preparation of the country for defense; military training of the population; and legal foundations for the doctrine.

157. Agreements concerning border guards troops were signed at the Kiev summit on March 20, 1992.

158. *JPRS-UMA-94-035*, pp. 58-59.

159. Woff, 1995, p. D6-17.

160. Kangas, "Taking the Lead," p. 54.

161. According to Karimov, "The Tajik problem is a time bomb which could cause another conflict like Karabakh here, but a hundred times worse. Especially since the situation is influenced by what is happening in Afghanistan...The border between Tajikistan and

Afghanistan no longer exists. Every day groups cross it with weapons and drugs." Paris, *Liberation*, in French, September 8, 1992, p. 16, in *FBIS-SOV-92-178*, September 14, 1992, pp. 35-36.

162. Moscow, *INTERFAX*, in English, October 23, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-205*, October 24, 1995, pp. 63-64.

163. Uzbekistan's power system is fed from sources within the republic, which makes it self-sufficient in terms of energy. But, it provides energy to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and southern Kazakhstan; thus, when Tashkent felt the Tajik government was being intransigent at the negotiating table in December 1995, it shut off power to Tajikistan, citing unpaid bills (only 2 percent of the 1995 bill had been paid). Yet Tashkent supplied electricity as "humanitarian aid" to the ethnic-Uzbek warlord Dostum in northern Afghanistan in 1996, when he served as a buffer between fighting further south and Uzbekistan. Bruce Pannier, "The Gordian Knot of Energy," *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 3, February 21, 1997, p. 37.

164. Peter Ferdinand, ed., *The New States of Central Asia and their Neighbors*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 50. For the text of the agreement, see Tashkent, *Narodnoye Slovo*, in Russian, March 10, 1994, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-050*, March 15, 1994, pp. 40-42. The agreement allowed "the siting on their territory of military installations for joint use." It also maintained existing ties in the production, supply, and exporting of weapons and military equipment; use of test sites; training; mutual supplies for rear and medical security and for servicing of troop transports; and observance of social rights of servicemen. Servicemen in the armed forces of one party have the right to transfer to the armed forces of the other party to continue their service as defined by the January 22, 1993, treaty. The treaty was to be valid for 5 years.

165. Tashkent, *Tashkent Uzbekistan Television*, in Uzbek, April 6, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-067*, April 7, 1995, pp. 75-76.

166. *CDPP*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 44, November 27, 1996, p. 22.

167. Moscow, *Zaftra*, in Russian, June 1996, No. 28, p. 2, in *FBIS-SOV-96-145*, July 26, 1996, p. 50.

168. *CDPP*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 8, March 20, 1996, p. 20. "Why did the Uzbeks start ignoring Russian diplomats? For one thing, it's now obvious to the whole world that Russia is unable to perform the mission of a great power, or even an influential continental one."

169. Moscow, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in Russian, August 17, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-165*, August 23, 1996, p. 40.

170. Kangas, "Taking the Lead," p. 52.

171. Uzbekistan was the 22d state to joint PfP, in July 1994. Uzbekistan began sending officers to NATO schools (such as Oberamergau) as early as 1992. Petersen, p. 147.

172. Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, July 12, 1996, p. 3, in *FBIS-SOV-96-164-S*, August 22, 1996, p. 108. Already in 1995 more than 10 different U.S. missions and organizations were located in Uzbekistan, and more than 100 joint ventures were in operation. Tashkent, *Uzbekistan Television*, in Uzbek, April 6, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-067*, April 7, 1995, p. 76.

173. Tashkent, *Business Partner*, in Uzbek, July 25, 1996, p. 5, in *FBIS-SOV-96-146*, July 29, 1996, pp. 52-53.

174. Kangas, "Taking the Lead," p. 54.

175. "Bishkek Summit Produces Treaty on Eternal Friendship," *OMRI Daily Digest*, Part I, No. 8, January 13, 1997.

176. Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 80-92.

177. IMET funds are allocated by Congress under the Defense Foreign Assistance Act/Foreign Operations Bill. IMET funds are used to fund courses; the IMET office does not itself provide instruction.

	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan
FY94	90k	50k	50k	50k
FY95	97k	60k	95k	118k
FY96	388k	231k	223k*	213k
FY97	400k	250k	250k	250k

k = \$1,000.00

* actually expended 293k using end of year funds

178. Courses prepared include: English language; Command and General Staff College, Advance Courses in infantry, armor, and intelligence; Naval Staff College; International Defense Management Course; Officer Courses in infantry, judge advocate general, engineer, military police, adjutant general, and public affairs; and Air War College. Not all have yet been utilized. Recently Congress also altered its former policy that required civilian students (e.g., Ministry of

Defense officials) to acquire a waiver to attend courses; civilian attendance is now encouraged.

179. European Command inherited Central Asia when the Soviet Union broke up. It was redesignated the responsibility of Central Command in 1998.

180. Founded on June 5, 1993, the Marshall Center aids senior defense and foreign ministries to develop national security organizations and systems that reflect democratic principles. The Marshall Center was chartered by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and funded by the U.S. Congress, but also receives support from the German Government and its Defense Ministry. The College of Strategic Studies and Defense Economies which teaches foreign officers is divided into the Department of Democratic Defense Management and the Department of European/Eurasian Security Studies. The Institute for Eurasian Studies comprises the Foreign Area Officer Program, the Foreign Language Training Center (Europe), and the English Language program to enhance language skills of foreign defense and foreign ministry officials to assist their integration into Western defense structures.

181. The OSIA predates the fall of the Soviet Union; it was founded in 1988 under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to implement the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by conducting on-site inspections to verify destruction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. President Bush expanded the OSIA in May 1990 to support inspections for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), two nuclear test agreements (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty), and various chemical weapons agreements, to include the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Responsibility for inspections for the Open Skies Treaty was added in 1992 and for START II in 1993.

182. Originally the focus of attention was on nuclear weapons. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus also became implementing parties of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. One of the four "points of entry" for inspectors was established in Almaty. Also, a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) and an Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) were set up in Almaty. Kazakh inspectors now escort U.S. inspectors to former Soviet sites; inspections continue until 2001. Inspections continue at Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe ICBM facilities, the Leninsk Test Range, and the Heavy Bomber Facility at Semipalatinsk. OSIA also has the right to conduct suspect site inspections to confirm

that covert assembly of mobile ICBMs is not occurring; Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan, is on this list. Under the 1990 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Semipalatinsk Test site is one of three test sites specified in the Treaty Protocol for inspection, but this program has slowed following Russian and U.S. moratoria on underground nuclear tests. Finally, OSIA supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) by sponsoring projects and assisting delegations through the ACIU in Almaty.

183. CTRP funds provide the DoD direct support for efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction; to transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and to establish verifiable safeguards against their proliferation. Materiel Protection, Control, and Accountability activities have been shifted to the Department of Energy. CTRP figures (in thousands of dollars) for FY 1996 included:

	Notified	Agreed	Other	Obligated	Disbursed
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	70,000	70,000	0	33,608	1,174
Nuclear Infrastructure Elimination	7,000	6,000	1,000	1,530	1,066
Emergency Response Tng/Equipment	5,000	5,000	0	2,573	693
Industrial Partnerships	15,000	15,000	0	14,909	2,955
Defense Enterprise Fund	7,000	0	7,000	7,000	7,000
Defense and Military Contacts	900	0	900	151	59
Material Control and Accountability	8,000	8,000	0	7,618	1,482
Science and Technology Center	9,000	0	9,000	8,950	0
Export Controls	7,260	7,260	0	3,085	479
Govt-to-Govt Communications Link	2,300	2,300	0	856	518
Total	131,460	113,560	17,900	80,280	15,426

Source: *Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union*, No. 4, May 1996, pp. 53-54.

184. Almaty, *KARAVAN-BLITS*, in Russian, September 2, 1996, p. 1, in *FBIS-SOV-96-175*, September 9, 1996, p. 64.

185. Almaty, *Kazakh Television First Program Network*, in Russian, March 11, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96-049*, March 12, 1996, p. 50. DoD programs complement commercial ventures. For example, U.S.-Uzbek defense conversion efforts only began in earnest following Defense

Secretary Perry's visit in 1994; by 1995 Uzbek Defense Minister Rustam Ahmedov had visited the United States to work out details, projects were submitted to American entrepreneurs, a seminar was held in Tashkent (December 1995), and specific offers to joint ventures were made. These plans were endorsed in May 1996 during the visit by Barry Carter, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Export Administration, Department of Commerce. Tashkent, *Business Partner*, in Uzbek, July 25, 1996, p. 5, in *FBIS-SOV-96-146*, July 29, 1996, pp. 52-53.

186. Defense Attache Offices (DAO) are administered by the Defense Intelligence Agency, but in the post-Cold War era their missions in the Former Soviet Union have swung increasingly toward nation building. The Defense Attache (DATT, the senior service-member) has assumed responsibility for a myriad of DoD personnel stationed in-country outside the DAO chain of command. The DATT serves on the Ambassador's Country Team as the senior military advisor. Attache staff administer IMET funds; coordinate attendance at U.S. service schools, the George C. Marshall Institute in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and specialized courses in the United States; oversee Nunn-Lugar programs; provide the logistical support for military-to-military contact programs; and administer the Partnership-for-Peace program. Occasionally they are involved in highly classified, specialized missions such as Operation SAPPHERE, during which the U.S. Air Force secretly extracted roughly 600 kilograms of unsecured highly-enriched uranium from Ust' Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This is in addition to their normal responsibilities to liaison with local military officials and to visit garrisons, training institutes, Ministry of Defense offices, and so forth. What makes this most remarkable is that in many of the Central Asian states, due to manpower shortages, the DAO consists of a lone attache with one support noncommissioned officer.

187. See Gudrum Wacker, "China Builds Ties, Trade Across Its Western Border, *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 17, August 23, 1996, pp. 30-33.

188. *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 29, January 7, 1998, pp. 21-22.

189. This distrust of Turkey is shared by another traditional rival, Russia. Following Prime Minister Yilmaz' trip to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in April 1998, the Russian press noted Turkey's increasing regional influence, the result of supporting the Central Asian states at various fora (ECO, U.N., etc.) and investment of \$1.5 billion in Uzbekistan alone over the last 6 years. Turkey's influence was also growing in the Caucasus, where the Turkish Chief of the General Staff visited Georgia and Azerbaijan that same month and signed military agreements. *CDPP*, Vol. 50, No. 16, May 20, 1998, pp. 22-23.

190. Interview by author with defense officials, Almaty and Bishkek, July 1997.

191. *CDPP*, Vol XLVIII, No. 33, September 11, 1996, p. 24.

192. *Ibid.*

193. Dianne L. Smith, *A New Great Game?*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

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